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ABSTRACT 
In 2013, ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked information 
that revealed the extent to which several countries, including the United 
States, developed a global surveillance system capable of collecting and 
sharing a massive amount of information. A direct consequence of the 
Snowden disclosures was the public backlash against large technology 
companies, who in turn strengthened security measures on consumer 
smartphones to reduce unauthorized government access. Apple, in 
particular, designated itself as the company that prioritizes user security 
and privacy above all, and now boasts some of the strongest encryption 
measures on the consumer market. This Note addresses the new problem 
that arose from this development: the clash between law enforcement, 
which desires probative evidence from encrypted smartphones and entities 
(including technology companies and users), who have a vested interest 
in the protection of the data. Described as the “Going Dark” problem or 
the “Encryption Debate,” this Note explores this tension in various 
jurisdictions and offers important considerations in how a country might 
ultimately resolve it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the critically acclaimed television sitcom, Parks and 
Recreation, one of the main characters, Ron Swanson, protects his 
privacy with a zealous vigor and repudiates the local government’s 
attempts to gather information about his life.1 Throughout the 
show, Swanson takes exaggerated efforts to prevent his coworkers 
from learning anything about him beyond his name, leading to 
comical interactions with other characters who hold differing 
opinions on the amount of personal information they are willing 
to reveal to the world. His battle for his right to privacy falters, 
however, when a new technology company in town collects and 
uses the data without any authorization from the user. Though 
this company is entirely fictional, Swanson’s concerns about the 
unauthorized collection and misuse of his personal information 
reflect concerns of real individuals. He worries that the collected 
data might fall into the wrong hands, and for him, the wrong 
hands often belong to nonsensical bureaucrats. 
Parks and Recreation’s arc picks up on a trope popularized by 
George Orwell’s 1984,2 which depicts a world where technological 
 
1. See Adrienne Tyler, Parks & Recreation: How Old Ron Swanson Is at The Beginning 
& End, SCREENRANT (Aug. 1, 2020), https://screenrant.com/parks-recreation-ron-
swanson-nick-offerman-age-old/ [https://perma.cc/JXS6-SDDJ]; see also Jason 
Diamond, Masculinity in the Age of Ron Swanson: The Legacy of Parks and Recreation’s Most 
Iconic Character, VULTURE (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.vulture.com/2015/02/parks-and-
recreation-ron-swanson-masculinity.html [https://perma.cc/YTY2-2PNP]. 
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (alternatively published as Nineteen Eighty-Four). 
See, e.g., Ian Crouch, So Are We Living in 1984?, NEW YORKER MAG. (June 11, 2013), 
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advances resulted in increased government surveillance and 
pervasive violations of privacy rights. Nearly thirty years later than 
Orwell’s timeline, in 2013, Edward Snowden exposed the global 
surveillance state.3 His disclosures revealed the extent to which 
the US government had surveilled its citizens, as well as the 
activities of other governments in collecting data on both their 
citizens and persons in other countries.4 The US government 
deemed this level of surveillance necessary and found that 
pending threats from foreign actors outweighed the risks to civil 
liberties.5 
One of the most shocking revelations was that these 
governments manipulated existing technology created by 
prominent companies to gather the information.6 For companies 
like Apple, the Snowden disclosures posed a serious problem.7 To 
the outside world, technology companies appeared to be eagerly 
complying with government data-collection programs, and 
smartphones (like the iPhone), which were intended to help 
individuals connect, were instead being used as surveillance tools 
 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/so-are-we-living-in-1984 
[https://perma.cc/299D-RJC8]. The novel injected phrases such as “Big Brother is 
watching you” into popular culture. For an example of its influence on the American 
judiciary, see Judge Reinhart’s dissent in United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th 
Cir. 2004). Judge Reinhardt illustrates the concerns of a police state and underlines the 
importance of adapting the law to today’s technology. Id. 
3. See Rachel Taylor, Intelligence-Sharing Agreements & International Data Protection: 
Avoiding A Global Surveillance State, 17 WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 731, 731 (2018). 
4. See Mark Mazetti & Michael Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S. 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-
surveillance-data.html?searchResultPosition=7 [https://perma.cc/9DRT-Y7CM]; 
Snowden Revelations, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations 
[https://perma.cc/ZV3D-F7LW] (last visited May 31, 2020) (indicating that, for 
example, the National Security Agency has worked with Australia, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom). 
5. See TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, AND 
THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NSA 17 (The Brookings Inst., 2017). 
6. Snowden Revelations, supra note 4. 
7. See Kristen Jacobsen, Game of Phones, Data Isn’t Coming: Modern Mobile Operating 
System Encryption and its Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 566, 589 
(2017) (“Numerous technology companies, including Apple and Google, redesigned 
their products to include encryption in direct response to Edward Snowden’s infamous 
disclosure regarding the US government’s mass surveillance.”). 
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by the government.8 Subsequent scandals highlighted the abuse 
of data by malevolent actors when technology companies failed 
to vigilantly restrict data access.9 In response to negative public 
reactions, Apple and other technology companies doubled their 
commitment to privacy and security by embracing stronger 
encryption on their products.10 While the average iPhone user 
may have been thrilled by the idea that the government could not 
get into her smartphone so easily,11 law enforcement officials in 
varying jurisdictions are now frustrated by the fact that encryption 
impedes their efforts to solve crimes.12 
Referred to by some as the “Encryption Debate” and by 
others as the “Going Dark” problem,13 this conflict between law 
 
8. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Evolution into a Privacy Liner, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-evolution-into-a-privacy-hard-liner-
1456277659 [https://perma.cc/42L7-7Z8J]. 
9. See Matthew Rosenberg & Gabriel Dance, Affected Users Say Facebook Betrayed Them, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2018, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/facebook-
users-data-harvested-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/E4YF-N75X]. See also 
Emily Stewart, Mark Zuckerberg said Facebook “made mistakes” on the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal. He’s not apologizing, VOX (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/3/21/17148852/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-
cambridge-analytica-breach. A related issue is the misuse of data by the technology 
companies themselves, but that issue will not be discussed as it is beyond the scope of the 
arguments posited here. 
10. See Wakabayashi, supra note 8. See also Scott J. Shackelford et al., iGovernance: 
The Future of Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance in the Wake of the Apple Encryption Saga, 
42 N.C. INT’L L. 883, 924 (2017) (“[T]he U.S. government does not seem to fully 
comprehend how the rules of the game for companies like Apple, Google, Microsoft, 
and Facebook were changed by those disclosures. In fact, Apple’s strong commitment to 
encryption was likely informed by those revelations.”); David Sanger & Brian Chen, 
Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks Out NSA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-
signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/BYH8-6WNW]. 
11. But see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 172 
(2018) (“Despite all the publicity around security-enhancing technologies, we don’t 
know whether consumers actually care about them – that is, whether they buy the new 
iPhone because it has end-to-end encryption rather than because it has a bigger 
screen.”). 
12. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, MOVING THE 
ENCRYPTION POLICY CONVERSATION FORWARD, 3 (2019) [hereinafter CARNEGIE]. 
13. See Maj. Gen. Charles, J. Dunlap, Jr., Essay, Social Justice and Silicon Valley: A 
Perspective on the Apple-FBI Case and the “Going Dark” Debate, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1688 
(2017); CARNEGIE, supra note 12; WASH. POST EDITORIAL BD., Opinion, Putting the digital 
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enforcement and technology companies is currently playing out 
throughout the world and at the federal, state, and local levels in 
the United States.14 In many ways, striking the right balance in 
providing information to law enforcement while protecting 
security and privacy interests is an engineering problem, not a 
legal one.15 Yet, the “technological arms race”16 between 
governments and companies propelled to the front of the debate 
two significant legal questions on resolving this tension: first, 
whether the government can compel technology companies like 
Apple to code backdoors17 into their smartphones to provide 
“extraordinary access” to data, and second, whether the use of 
alternative methods by the government implicates existing 
privacy rights. 
This Note explores and analyzes these questions with a focus 
on the US approach to extraction of data from encrypted 
smartphones. This discussion proceeds in five Parts. Part II 
provides the factual background for the debate: a primer on 
encryption, interests of law enforcement, and the two 
technological methods at issue in the debate. Part III explores the 
current international legal landscape with a focus on the 
countries that are most vocal in the Encryption Debate: the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and China. Part IV 
discusses US laws and cases on the debate, analyzes the two issues 
posed above, and provides important considerations and 
implications for resolving the debate in the United States. Part V 
argues that the United States should not compel technology 
companies to provide extraordinary access to smartphones by 
modifying the encryption code, and should instead utilize other 
means of procuring data that does not threaten existing security 
and privacy rights. Part VI concludes by reiterating that lawful 
hacking is the appropriate solution for the Encryption Debate 
 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. See Steven Levy, Cracking the Crypto War, WIRED MAG. (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-war-clear-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/FM9K-
N49K]; Steven Bellovin et al., Analysis of the CLEAR Protocol per the National Academies’ 
Framework, 3 DEP’T COMPUT. SCI. COLUM. U. 18, 2 (May 10, 2018) (critiquing one 
proposed engineering option). 
16. CYRUS VANCE JR., REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
ON: SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 30 (Nov. 2016) [hereinafter VANCE 
2016]. 
17. See infra Section II.C. 
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and that the United States’ ultimate choice will have a global 
impact. 
II. THE FACTS ABOUT ENCRYPTION 
The term “encryption” evokes images of computer hackers 
racing against the clock to crack the code and help the suave hero 
save the world.18 In reality, encryption refers to a method of data 
protection wherein said data is scrambled, making it inaccessible 
to anyone without the “decryption key.”19 The value of encryption 
depends on the end user, the type of data that needs to be 
protected, and the complications that may arise when the 
accessibility of that data becomes strictly limited to specific users. 
To understand the role of encryption in the debate, this Part 
provides the factual background giving rise to the tension. 
Section II.A discusses the ideological underpinnings of 
encryption and data protection, details on how encryption works, 
and how Apple20 uses encryption in its devices. Section II.B 
 
18. For a real-life example of hackers saving the day, consider the hacktivist group, 
Anonymous. The group espoused libertarian views, sometimes extreme and divisive, but 
often efforts focused on uncovering and revealing the conduct of malevolent actors. Dale 
Beran, The Return of Anonymous, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/08/hacker-group-anonymous-
returns/615058/ [https://perma.cc/6HLJ-XQLQ]. Its founder, Aubrey Cottle, has set 
his sights on dispelling falsehoods spread by QAnon—a group whose supporters have 
notably manipulated and warped public discourse to the point that the FBI considers it 
a domestic terror threat. See Shawn Langlois, Founder of hacker group Anonymous reveals his 
ultimate ‘end-game’, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/founder-of-hacker-group-anonymous-reveals-his-
ultimate-endgame-11604336926 [https://perma.cc/DDF9-749A]; A.J. Vicens & Ali 
Breland, QAnon is Supposed to Be All About Protecting Kids. Its Primary Enabler Appears to 
Have Hosted Child Porn Domains, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/10/jim-watkins-child-pornography-
domains/ [https://perma.cc/TB9U-P2Q4]; Kevin Roose, What is QAnon, the Viral Pro-
Trump Conspiracy Theory?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html [https://perma.cc/F9H3-
TTBN]. 
19. See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 9 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ohm, Good Enough]; see also Whitson Gordon, The One Thing that Protects a 
Laptop After It’s Been Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2018, at B6, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/smarter-living/how-to-encrypt-your-computers-
data.html [https://perma.cc/B6TB-KD54]. 
20. The analysis in the Note applies to all technology companies, but will use Apple 
as example given its prevalence in the industry. Apple boasts has the strongest encryption 
software on the consumer market. See Matt Burgess, Apple’s privacy strength is also one of its 
greatest weaknesses, WIRED MAG. (May 21, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-
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discusses the legitimate interests of law enforcement in 
preventing and resolving crimes and how encryption serves as a 
barrier to those interests. Section II.C presents and explains two 
technological mechanisms used by law enforcement as 
workarounds to encrypted smartphones, and will lay the 
foundation for the discussion and analysis of its legal implications 
in later Parts. 
A. Encryption: Ideologies, Description, and its Use in the iPhone 
1. The Value of Encryption 
The desire to protect personal data—and the corollary need 
to build the infrastructure that controls information flows—
seems intuitive,21 or at least reasonable in an age when technology 
companies are constantly challenged on their duties to their 
users.22 Encryption, a form of data protection, is primarily used in 
two ways: privacy and cybersecurity. Though the terms privacy and 
cybersecurity are often used interchangeably, issues of data 
privacy are different from those of cybersecurity.23 Data 
protection and data privacy refers to ensuring the privacy of 
personal information through laws regulating the collection, use, 
and control of personal data,24 whereas cybersecurity is narrower 
and refers specifically to the infrastructure built to secure data, 
personal or non-personal.25 Both have the goal of securing data, 
 
security-privacy-competitive-advantage [https://perma.cc/SS5X-L26W]. Other 
prominent technology companies, including Google and Huawai, also offer encryption 
on their devices. See Eric Manpearl, The International Front of the Going Dark Debate, 22 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 158, 162 (2019); Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 575. 
21. See generally Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
22. Shira Ovide, Congress Agrees: Big Tech is Broken, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/technology/congress-big-tech.html 
[https://perma.cc/JX9Q-CB9T]; 4 Key Takeaways from Washington’s Big Tech Hearing on 
‘Monopoly Power’, NPR (July 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/30/896952403/4-
key-takeaways-from-washingtons-big-tech-hearing-on-monopoly-power 
[https://perma.cc/Z67X-DNM4]. 
23. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MIN. L. REV. 1135, 1141 
(2019). 
24. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 10, at 7-8; McGeveran, supra note 23, at 1141. 
25. See McGeveran, supra note 23, at 1141. 
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and encryption serves as one of several methods to prevent the 
unauthorized collection of data.26 
Some entities value encryption because it is a form of 
cybersecurity.27 Banks, businesses, and pharmaceutical 
companies are illustrative of some entities that have an interest in 
protecting their trade secrets and proprietary information from 
hackers and other bad actors.28 At a more granular level, 
encryption ensures that the everyday computer user may enter 
credit card information at the payment page of, for example, a 
hotel website, without the concern that the information is being 
stolen or misappropriated.29 Data breaches at large companies, 
including Target and Equifax, resulted in the release of 
information such as social security numbers, mailing addresses, 
and other confidential records.30 Even the US federal 
government is susceptible to cyberattacks: in 2015, the Office of 
Personnel Management suffered a data breach that resulted in 
the data of over 4.2 million employees being stolen.31 As 
demonstrated by these examples, encryption matters in ensuring 
that such confidential information is kept secure and private by 
the entities entrusted to hold it.32 Moreover, encryption is a 
necessary step in preventing sensitive and confidential 
information from getting into the hands of malicious actors and 
hackers.33 
 
26. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 9-10. 
27. See John Mylan Traylor, Note, Shedding Light on the “Going Dark Problem” and the 
Encryption Debate, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 489, 491-92 (2016). 
28. See Erick S. Lee & Adam R. Pearlman, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism, 
and Kyllo: How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms are Affecting the Fourth Amendment, 2 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 719, 763 (2015). 
29. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 257 
(3rd Cir. 2015) (finding that a hotel chain’s failure to secure consumer credit card 
information had monetary implications for consumers and credit card companies). 
30. Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-
security-breach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/VG9A-86UW]; Equifax Data Breach 
Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/refunds/equifax-data-breach-settlement [https://perma.cc/R97E-AGYA] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
31. Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incidents, OFF. PERS. MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ 
[https://perma.cc/V6E8-RXF4] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). 
32. See Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 758. 
33. See Traylor, supra note 27, at 493. 
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Others use encryption because they value their privacy and 
are interested in controlling the distribution of information 
about themselves.34 Facebook users, for example, were furious 
when they found out their personal information was released to 
a third-party, who then exploited that information by tailoring 
deceptive advertisements and false news articles to ultimately 
influence their votes in the 2016 US presidential elections.35 To 
some, privacy allows an individual to explore her capacity for self-
determination, autonomy, and worth.36 It creates a sphere where 
a person can engage in the process of identifying conceptions of 
herself or define her intimate relationships to others.37 Here, 
encryption is a tool that provides a person the security she desires 
in controlling who has access to information about herself. 
Last, some value encryption as a form of protection from 
government surveillance and state control of personal data.38 As 
the entity with a monopoly on legitimate violence, the 
government can exact punishment or sanctions that other actors 
cannot.39 Encryption, thus, is necessary to secure protection from 
government abuses. Privacy scholars argue that individuals are 
free to generate ideas when the government is not involved given 
that government oversight may instead lead to a chilling effect on 
speech, free expression, or other limitations on civil rights.40 
Where some see the oversight as necessary to incentivize good 
behavior and to hold individuals or entities accountable for their 
actions,41 others advance the notion that democracy is more 
 
34. Julia Carrie Wong & Matthew Cantor, How to speak Silicon Valley: 53 essential tech-
bro terms explained, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/jun/26/how-to-speak-silicon-valley-decoding-tech-bros-from-microdosing-
to-privacy [https://perma.cc/7ABP-3BXZ] (“privacy (n) – Archaic. The concept of 
maintaining control over one’s personal information.”). 
35. See CARNEGIE, supra note 12. 
36. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 21. 
37. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that the US 
Constitution creates zones, or penumbras, of privacy). 
38. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 121; Olivia Gonzalez, Cracks in the Armor: Legal 
Approaches to Encryption, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2019). 
39. André Munro, State Monopoly on Violence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence (last visited Jan. 24, 
2021). 
40. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 22; Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 4 
(“unburdened by the chilling effect of surveillance”). 
41. Tom Huddleston Jr., Bill Gates: ‘Government needs to get involved’ to regulate big tech 
companies, CNBC (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/17/bill-gates-
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effective when citizens are free to make decisions without 
government oversight.42 In this regard, privacy from government 
intrusion is necessary for dissidents or freedom fighters who seek 
to reform civil society without the fear of repercussions from their 
respective governments.43 In less contentious settings, many, 
including industry leaders in Silicon Valley, view encryption as 
necessary to balance against surveillance technology used by law 
enforcement and restore the playing field to pre-digital-age 
levels.44 Encryption returns to some the option to control how 
their personal information is used as technological advances 
threaten the surrender of that control.45 
2. Defining Encryption 
Encryption is a catch-all term used to refer to a method of 
data protection wherein said data is scrambled, making it 
inaccessible to anyone without a “decryption key” (the code that 
would unlock the encryption).46 Unlike typical password 
protection, encryption is coded in such a way that it is 
theoretically impossible for the average user to break the 
encryption without a decryption key. 47 Thus, encryption offers a 
reasonable amount of confidentiality to its users. However, it is 




42. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 62. 
43. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 20; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 119. 
44. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 119; THERESA M. PAYTON & THEODORE 
CLAYPOOLE, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 237 (Rowman & Littlefield publ. 2014). 
45. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 177 (“Only a few companies . . . are willing to 
say what many engineers feel: government surveillance has become excessive, and the 
playing field needs to be rebalanced in the direction of user privacy.”). 
46. As Section II.B discusses, decryption is not an impossible feat—rather, it is about 
the resources and capabilities available to decrypt the device. For example, a major 
project at the NSA is to circumvent encryption measures. See Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. 
Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, at A1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html 
[https://perma.cc/R56Z-KSR7]; see also Bruce Schneier, NSA surveillance: A guide to 
staying secure, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-
surveillance [https://perma.cc/QVT2-CPKE]. 
47. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 9. The terms “encryption” and 
“encrypted” are used interchangeably in the Encryption Debate. 
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how each type is applied to tangible products and intangible 
services. 
The two main types of encryption are “end-to-end 
encryption” (or “double encryption”) and “device encryption” 
(or “full-disk encryption”).48 End-to-end encryption refers to data 
that can only be decrypted by the original sender and the 
intended recipient.49 End-to-end encryption is applied to protect 
“data-in-motion,”50 or data that is being shared with others, 
including text messages and emails. Many communication 
services, like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, use end-to-end 
encryption to ensure that the only people who can access 
communications are the sender(s) and recipient(s).51 Device 
encryption, on the other hand, refers to a type of encryption 
where the decryption key exists only on the locked device.52 
Device encryption protects “data-at-rest,” which is data that is not 
being shared with others in the way that data-in-motion is.53 
Device encryption can be used to encrypt external hard drives 
and other devices.54 This Note focuses on the latter type of 
encryption and will explain in later sections why in some contexts 
data derived from an encrypted smartphone is different from 
data derived from encrypted communications on that 
smartphone. 
3. Apple and its Use of Encryption 
Apple is a technology company with global operations 
founded in the United States and whose devices are available in 
several major international markets.55 Its products and services 
dominate a significant share in the markets of each jurisdiction 
 
48. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 574. 
49. See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, The International Encryption Debate: 
Privacy Versus Big Brother, 261 N.Y. L.J. (June 12, 2019). 
50. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 135. 
51. See Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is End-to-End Encryption?, WIRED MAG. 
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-end-
encryption/ [https://perma.cc/FD3Z-8574]. 
52. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160. 
53. See Anello & Albert, supra note 49. 
54. Id. 
55. Apple, Inc., CNN, 
https://money.cnn.com/quote/profile/profile.html?symb=AAPL 
[https://perma.cc/3RD4-UNAG] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
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discussed in this Note.56 Apple produces hardware (e.g. 
computers and smartphones) and software (e.g. operating 
systems for its devices and associated applications).57 Its global 
popularity is in part due to its simple aesthetic and clean design.58 
Recently, the company refocused its brand by prioritizing user 
privacy, distinguishing it from other technology companies which 
used consumer data in their business models.59 In the post-
Snowden environment, Apple distinguished itself from 
companies like Google and Facebook, which rely on collecting 
and selling user data.60 When Apple introduced default 
encryption in 2014 for its iPhones by way of iOS 8, it made a 
credible guarantee, backed by an algorithm, that it could not 
access its users’ data, signifying its commitment to user privacy.61 
In addition to making encryption the default option on its 
devices, the company issued a public statement outlining its 
hardline stance on protecting the information of its consumers,62 
reaffirming that commitment with each new update of its 
 
56. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160. 
57. See CNN, Apple, Inc., supra note 55. 
58. See Walter Isaacson, How Steve Jobs’ Love of Simplicity Fueled a Design Revolution, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/how-
steve-jobs-love-of-simplicity-fueled-a-design-revolution-23868877/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RD4-UNAG]. The company founder, Steve Jobs, focused on 
creating a product free of the confusion and complexity commonly associated with 
emerging technologies. Id. 
59. See Wakabayashi, supra note 8 (“In the iPhone’s early days, Mr. Jobs told 
employees that the company, in effect, had a handshake agreement with customers: In 
exchange for buying the device, Apple would mess with their lives as little as possible, 
one former employee said. Generally speaking, this person said, that meant staying away 
from users’ data and respecting their privacy.”). 
60. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 116. By fall of 2020, Apple continued to 
distinguish itself from its industry competitors. Its newest smartphone operating system 
allows iPhone users to opt-in to companies tracking and collecting usage data across 
apps. See User Privacy and Data Use, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-
privacy-and-data-use/ [https://perma.cc/HN8C-BHZV] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Jack 
Nicas & Mike Isaac, Facebook and Apple Trade Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/facebook-takes-the-gloves-off-in-
feud-with-apple.html [https://perma.cc/25WG-SQV5].  
61. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 138. 
62. See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/DF4D-3JGQ] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2021); see also Romain Dillet, Apple’s Tim Cook on iPhone unlocking case, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 21, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/21/apples-tim-cook-
on-iphone-unlocking-case-we-will-not-shrink-from-this-responsibility/ 
[https://perma.cc/J9ER-Y49G] (“We have a responsibility to protect your data and your 
privacy. We will not shrink from this responsibility.”). 
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operating system.63 More, its smartphones have been at the center 
of prominent litigation in the United States.64 Thus, this Note will 
use Apple’s technology as the example moving forward. 
Apple, as both a hardware manufacturer and software 
developer, uses both types of encryption for its smartphones. It 
uses a form of end-to-end encryption for its iMessage and 
FaceTime applications, both of which facilitate communication.65 
In addition, Apple uses device encryption to lock the entire 
operating system on an iPhone when not in use.66 As an added 
safety measure, numerous failed password attempts reset the 
phone to factory settings,67 which prevents entities from using 
brute-force methods to gain access to the data on the phone.68 
The company has explained that the nature of the encryption 
precludes it from retaining decryption keys for both forms of 
encryption.69 Simply put, if decryption keys were physical items, 
Apple would not have a copy it could provide to law enforcement 
or any other entity who requests one. 
Despite their supposed resistance to law enforcement 
requests,70 Apple and other technology companies follow all laws 
of their respective jurisdictions and have issued guidance on how 
 
63. iOS 14 is Available Today, APPLE (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/09/ios-14-is-available-today/ 
[https://perma.cc/C5J3-XLR6] (“More Transparency and Control with Expanded 
Privacy Features”). 
64. See infra Part IV. 
65. See Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/features/ 
[https://perma.cc/84XP-MKZE] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
66. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 574. 
67. See Shackelford, supra note 10, at 894. 
68. Orin Kerr, Preliminary thoughts on the Apple iPhone order in the San Bernardino case, 
Opinion, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-
san-bernardino-case-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/3QBG-DK8K] (“I think it’s probably 
more accurate to say that this particular model phone, the iPhone 5C, has a built-in 
security weakness—depending on how you define the term, a kind of backdoor—already. 
The government’s order would require Apple to exploit the potential backdoor in 
Apple’s design. Importantly, though, Apple redesigned its phones after the iPhone 5C to 
close this potential backdoor but see update below). Later phones, starting with the 
iPhone 5S, have apparently eliminated this potential way in. As a result, the specifics of 
the order in the San Bernardino case probably only involve certain older iPhones.”). 
69. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 1. For iPhone users who forget their passwords, 
the only solution an entire reset of the device and a complete loss of their data. Id. 
70. See infra Part IV. 
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to request information.71 Notably, Apple cannot extract data from 
passcode locked iOS devices because it “does not possess the 
encryption key.”72 Thus, Apple can and does make an effort to 
comply with law enforcement requests and is only limited by the 
very algorithms that fulfill its promises of privacy to consumers. 
B. The Legitimate Interests of Law Enforcement 
For law enforcement, the data and content on encrypted 
smartphones offer significant evidentiary value.73 As one legal 
scholar frames it, “[t]his mass of data tells rich stories about our 
lives—what we do and where, when, and with whom we do it. 
Hence, it’s a treasure trove for surveillance officials.”74 The data 
that can be recovered from encrypted smartphones can provide 
inculpatory evidence for past crimes or help prevent future 
ones.75 Targeted criminal activity ranges between terrorist acts, 
 
71. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/NC78-JRCF] [hereinafter 
Cook Letter]. On its website, Apple provides guidance for law enforcement both in the 
United States and in outside jurisdictions. For the United States, Apple “will only provide 
content in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.” Legal 
Process Guidelines: Government & Law Enforcement within the United States, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZRK3-FNUS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Apple US 
Guidelines]. For jurisdictions outside the United States, Apple states that for it “to 
disclose customer information in response to a request from law enforcement, it is 
necessary for the requesting officer to indicate the legal basis which authorises the 
collection of evidential information in the form of personal data by a law enforcement 
agency from a Data Controller such as Apple.” Legal Process Guidelines: Government & Law 
Enforcement outside the United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-
enforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7RK-BZW6] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2021) [hereinafter Apple Int’l Guidelines]. In any request, Apple can readily 
provide information on device registration, customer service records, iTunes 
information, retail and online store transactions, gift cards, iCloud data and content, and 
“Find My iPhone” data. See Apple US Guidelines, supra note 71; Apple Int’l Guidelines, 
supra note 71. 
72. See Apple US Guidelines, supra note 71, at 11; Apple Int’l Guidelines, supra note 
71, at 11; see also Caren Morrison, Private Actors, Corporate Data, and National Security: What 
Assistance Do Tech Companies Owe Law Enforcement, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J, 407, 410 
(2017). 
73. See CARNEGIE, supra note 12, at 11. 
74. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 114. 
75. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577-78; see Eric Manpearl, Preventing “Going Dark”: 
A Sober Analysis and Reasonable Solution to Preserve Security in the Encryption Debate, 28 U. 
FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 74 (2017) [hereinafter Manpearl II]. 
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crimes in local areas, and the sexual exploitation of children.76 
Often, a significant amount of information can only be found on 
the physical smartphone (as opposed to the data being 
transmitted elsewhere) either because of the way the smartphone 
software processes the code or because the user opts in to the 
smartphone’s protective measures, preventing the data from 
being accessed remotely.77 Encryption, thus, serves as a barrier to 
these law enforcement interests because encryption code 
prevents law enforcement from accessing underlying data that 
may be necessary for the prevention, detection, and solution of 
crimes.78 This Section will elaborate on some of these government 
interests and the way encryption has frustrated law enforcement 
efforts. 
1. National Security 
The September 11 terrorist attacks saw a marked shift in US 
government surveillance tactics starting with 2001’s Patriot Act 
which conveyed increased surveillance powers to US law 
enforcement in its counterterrorism efforts.79 Timothy Edgar, 
who helped build some of the surveillance programs used by the 
US’s National Security Agency (“NSA”) that were later revealed 
by Snowden in 2013, argues that technology-enhanced 
surveillance tactics have been necessary in neutralizing terrorists 
and other intelligence targets.80 The data that can be recovered 
from encrypted smartphones belonging to suspected terrorists 
can be necessary, according to top US officials, in preventing 
 
76. MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION 
AND PUBLIC SAFETY i (2015), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-
content/themes/dany/files/11.18.15%20Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryptio
n%20and%20Public%20Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5ZG-RNNN] [hereinafter 
Vance 2015]. 
77. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577-78. 
78. See PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 44, at 207; Manpearl II, supra note 75 at 
66; Morrison, supra note 72, at 409. 
79. See Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 769. The specific provision of the 2001 
Patriot Act was later declared unlawful by a US court but Congress quickly followed with 
a replacement. See TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, 
AND THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NSA 4 (Brookings Inst. Press 2017). The concern 
was global, with other nations expressing similar fears of terrorist attacks, culminating in 
the multilateral cooperation between nations exchanging data and information in the 
interest of keeping those within their borders safe. Id. 
80. See EDGAR, supra note 79, at 8. 
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future attacks or for gathering information on the perpetrators of 
a past attack.81 The events and aftermath of two distinct terrorist 
attacks in the United States vindicates these national security 
concerns. 
On December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen 
Malik walked into a holiday party at a social services center in San 
Bernardino, California, and killed fourteen people while injuring 
twenty-one others.82 The Islamic State, a militant terrorist group 
based in Iraq and Syria, quickly took credit for the attack, though 
there was no evidence directly linking the shooters to the group.83 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) recovered Farook’s 
iPhone and with Apple’s assistance was able to recover iCloud 
data that was backed up through October 19, leaving six weeks of 
data unaccounted for.84 The FBI sought further help from Apple 
in extracting the remaining data, but Apple refused, explaining it 
would not write code that allows the FBI to bypass the phone’s 
encryption measures.85 The FBI sought a judgment to compel 
Apple to write code that would permit backdoor access to the 
 
81. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. William P. Barr, Keynote Address at the International 
Conference on Cyber Security 1, 5 (July 23, 2019); Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 
786; Dunlap, supra note 13, at 1697. 
82. See Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Is Treating Rampage as Act 
of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, at A1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html 
[https://perma.cc/7XJL-98TD]; Alex Dobuzinskis, In San Bernardino, solemn ceremony 
marks mass shooting, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
california-shooting-anniversary/in-san-bernardino-solemn-ceremony-marks-mass-
shooting-idUSKBN13R13R [https://perma.cc/ZV8J-XTEM]. 
83. See Laura Wagner, Still No Evidence Linking San Bernardino Shooters to ISIS, FBI 
Says, NPR (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/12/16/460021165/still-no-evidence-linking-san-bernardino-shooters-to-isis-
fbi-says [https://perma.cc/VAE5-ANAA]. 
84. See Ellen Nakashima & Mark Berman, FBI asked San Bernardino to reset the 




85. See Ellen Nakashima, Why Apple is in a historic fight with the government over one 
iPhone, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/why-apple-is-in-a-historic-fight-with-the-government-over-one-
iphone/2016/02/17/c512c9ba-d59b-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/FZ76-QZYV]; see Leander Kahney, The FBI Wanted a Back Door to the 
iPhone. Tim Cook Said No, WIRED MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-time-tim-cook-stood-his-ground-against-fbi/ 
[https://perma.cc/H69Z-CH28]. 
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phone,86 but dropped the case a few months later after reportedly 
paying a third-party company over US$1.3 million to hack the 
phone.87 The FBI did not reveal whether the extracted 
information was useful.88 
The US government encountered this problem again more 
recently in January 2020 when it recovered two iPhones 
belonging to a suspected terrorist, and was again unable to access 
the iPhones’ password-protected contents.89 On December 8, 
2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani went on a shooting rampage 
at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida.90 Apple turned over 
the relevant data that was in its possession, but again stated it was 
unable to access the data on the locked, encrypted iPhone, and 
that it would not write code permitting backdoor access into the 
device.91 More than four months later in May 2020, the FBI 
managed to access the data through an alternative method,92 and 
found evidence of Alshamrani’s connection with al-Qaida.93 
 
86. The case and other judicial opinions will be analyzed later on in this Note. See 
infra Part IV. 
87. See Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Director Suggests Bill for an iPhone 
Hacking Topped $1.3 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2016, at B3, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/us/politics/fbi-director-suggests-bill-for-
iphone-hacking-was-1-3-million.html [https://perma.cc/8V4W-49K6]; Katie Benner & 
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked an iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2016, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-
justice-department-case.html [https://perma.cc/GU6A-WKME]. 
88. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Lawyer Won’t Say If Data from Unlocked iPhone is Useful, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at B3. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/technology/fbi-
lawyer-wont-say-if-data-from-unlocked-iphone-is-useful.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/DMR4-6BD7]. 
89. See Shannon Bond, Apple Declines DOJ Request to Unlock Pensacola Gunman’s 
Phones, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/796160524/apple-
declines-doj-request-to-unlock-pensacola-gunmans-phones [https://perma.cc/D9PE-
8YMB]; Jack Nicas & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Asks Apple To Help Unlock Two iPhones, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2020, at B7, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/apple-
fbi-iphone-encryption.html [https://perma.cc/T9P8-96GM]. 
90. See Laurel Wamsley, FBI Is Investigating Pensacola Shooting As Terrorism, NPR 
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/08/786089099/fbi-is-investigating-
pensacola-shooting-as-terrorism [https://perma.cc/D46X-C2KC]. 
91. See id.; Bond, supra note 89. 
92. See Kevin Collier & Cyrus Favirar, The FBI cracked another iPhone – but it’s still not 
happy with Apple, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/fbi-cracked-another-iphone-it-s-still-not-
happy-apple-n1209506 [https://perma.cc/F2GV-VB8E]. 
93. Hannah Allam, FBI: New iPhone Evidence Shows Pensacola Shooter Had Ties To Al-
Qaida, NPR (May 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/18/857932909/fbi-new-
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In both scenarios, in response to the US government’s 
requests to decrypt the smartphones, Apple stated it could not do 
so because it did not have the decryption key. Further, Apple 
refused to comply with requests to write code to allow for 
backdoor access, citing privacy and cybersecurity concerns.94 
Ultimately, in both cases, the US government used other methods 
to access the encrypted data, much to the chagrin of government 
officials who were not content with the limited solution given that 
its delay and expense hindered national security investigations.95  
The US federal government is not the only government 
entity citing national security concerns for gaining access to data 
on the encrypted smartphones. After a series of terrorist attacks 
in 2017, the British government expressed frustration at not 
being able to investigate the encrypted communications of the 
attackers.96 Likewise, France and Germany have been vocal about 
changing EU laws regarding law enforcement access to encrypted 
device data after suffering numerous terrorist attacks with death 
tolls of over 200.97 Australia, despite having not suffered a recent 
terrorist attack on the scale of those in these three mentioned 
countries, still cites national security concerns to justify provisions 
in its new law that may require technology companies to provide 




94. See Kahney, supra note 85. 
95. See Collier & Favirar, supra note 92; Nicas & Benner, supra note 89. 
96. See Mark Scott, Britain Demands Keys to Encrypted Messaging After London Attack, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2017, at B5, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/technology/whatsapp-rudd-terrorists-uk-
attack.html [https://perma.cc/4X5C-93FD]. Britain’s home secretary, Amber Rudd, 
explained that the British intelligence agencies were having trouble accessing encrypted 
messages sent through WhatsApp. Id. WhatsApp uses end-to-end encryption, which is 
different than the encryption focused on here, but the context is still important for this 
Note’s analysis. See Leo Kelion, WhatsApp’s privacy protections questioned after terror attack, 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39405178 
[https://perma.cc/XL4W-FHFY]. 
97. See Natasha Lomas, Encryption under fire in Europe as France and Germany call for 
decrypt law, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/24/encryption-under-fire-in-europe-as-france-and-
germany-call-for-decrypt-law/ [https://perma.cc/9QP9-WKGP]; Manpearl, supra note 
20, at 181. 
98. See Nellie Bowles, Did Australia Poke Hoke in Your Phone’s Security?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2019, at B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/technology/australia-
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recent laws passed in China, like the Counterterrorism Law, 
indicate that the Chinese government places a premium on 
smartphone data.99 Given that countries often look to each other 
to formulate domestic policies, the debate in the United States on 
whether national security concerns justify government access to 
encrypted data likely has global implications.100 
2. Local Crimes 
Accessing data-at-rest on iPhones is also an important goal 
for local law enforcement agencies given that the information is 
just as likely to be helpful in resolving crimes unrelated to 
national security.101 Recovered data can reveal information on the 
motivations and actions of any perpetrator, not just terrorists. 
Cyrus Vance, the Manhattan District Attorney and a strong 
advocate for data access, argues that smartphone data can be used 
to provide probative evidence in local crimes such as murders and 
serious injuries.102 To illustrate, text message exchanges that were 
stored only on a smartphone were key evidence the Los Angeles 
Police Department used to convict two parents for the death of 
their two-year old daughter.103 In another case, a long-haul 
trucker was convicted for sexual assault and kidnapping after law 
enforcement officials recovered video evidence of the assault 
from his cell phone.104 A third case involves the unsolved murder 
of a father of six, in which the only evidence was a locked iPhone 
6 and a Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge that were found beside his 
body.105 Though this type of evidence can be as critical to local 
 
cellphone-encryption-security.html [https://perma.cc/QXH6-PK8S]. A more thorough 
discussion of Australian laws will be in Section III.B. 
99. See Lorand Laskai & Adam Segal, The Encryption Debate in China, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 8 (May 30, 2019). 
100. See Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As encryption spreads, U.S. grapples with 




101. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 163. 
102. See VANCE 2016, supra note 16, at 8. 
103. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577. 
104. See Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 100. 
105. See Cyrus R. Vance Jr. et al., When Phone Encryption Blocks Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/opinion/apple-google-when-
phone-encryption-blocks-justice.html [https://perma.cc/VA3G-VZJR]. 
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groups in the prevention and resolution of crime, the agencies 
that need them are less likely to have the financial resources of 
the federal government to unlock the smartphones that contain 
them.106 Moreover, law enforcement in smaller, local jurisdictions 
are more likely to encounter locked smartphones without the 
resources to unlock them.107 
Other countries echo the need to use this data to solve local-
level crimes. British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed, 
“[t]his vital communications data is absolutely crucial not just to 
fight terrorism but finding missing people, murder 
investigations.”108 Australia’s Department of Home Affairs, 
likewise, expressed concerns on the effect that encryption has on 
law enforcements’ ability to address organized crime, smuggling, 
and the sexual exploitation of children.109 Local law enforcement 
agencies’ need for data from encrypted smartphones is globally 
apparent. 
3. Sexual Exploitation of Minors 
Preventing the sexual exploitation of children is a special use 
case for decryption and stands apart from the concerns outlined 
above in that this interest regards a vulnerable population that 
the United States historically has vigorously protected.110 A 2019 
investigation by The New York Times revealed how child abusers 
and sexual predators exploit encryption technology to perpetrate 
their crimes.111 Images are shared through encrypted 
 
106. See Manpearl II, supra note 75, at 74. 
107. See id. at 77. MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION 
AND PUBLIC SAFETY 4-5 (2017), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-
content/themes/dany/files/2017%20Report%20of%20the%20Manhattan%20District%
20Attorney%27s%20Office%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5D8D-G2RD] [hereinafter VANCE 2017]. 
108. See Rowena Mason, UK spy agencies need more powers, says Cameron, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/12/uk-spy-agencies-
need-more-powers-says-cameron-paris-attacks [https://perma.cc/79ZK-XET8]. 
109. See Stilgherrian, The Encryption Debate in Australia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE (2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debate-
in-australia-pub-79217 [https://perma.cc/PGP6-TZLC]. 
110. See Lawless Spaces: Warrant-proof Encryption and its Impact on Child Exploitation 
Cases, U.S. DEP’T  JUST. (Dec. 6, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawless-spaces-
warrant-proof-encryption-and-its-impact-child-exploitation-cases 
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Sexual Abuse. What Went Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019), 
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communications and stored on encrypted devices.112 At present, 
technology companies report the images only when they discover 
them and otherwise have no legal obligation to look for them on 
their platforms.113 On its products, Apple purports to use image 
matching technology to find images that are sent in 
transmission,114 though it is unclear if that technology can be used 
to preemptively scan images that are stored on the phone and not 
sent in transmission. 
US government officials frame encrypted communications 
and devices as a “law free zone” where predators may store images 
without the scrutiny of the criminal justice system.115 To 
government officials, by increasing encryption options, 
technology companies take a step back from alleviating the 
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problem.116 The evidence stored on smartphones could help 
identify victims and prevent further harms to unidentified child 
victims.117 Exploitative materials can be stored on smartphones 
without ever being transmitted, and oftentimes, can be the only 
evidence of wrongdoing.118 More, images depicting the sexual 
exploitation of children can cross international borders when 
such images are transmitted to different countries.119 Other 
countries, such as Australia, are raising the alarm that encryption 
technology impedes efforts to tackle and end child sexual 
exploitation.120 In the words of Facebook’s founder, Mark 
Zuckerberg, “[e]ncryption is a powerful tool for privacy but that 
includes the privacy of people doing bad things.”121 
C. Extraordinary Access and Lawful Hacking 
As explained in Section II.B above, criminal investigations 
are frustrated when law enforcement officials cannot access what 
might be potentially crucial data on an iPhone.122 In response to 
the limitations created by device encryption, law enforcement 
agencies have pursued two technological methods, each with 
important legal implications. The first method, termed 
“extraordinary access,” refers to the government, sometimes with 
the assistance of a technology company, accessing the data on a 
smartphone without external complications.123 The second 
method, termed “lawful hacking,” refers to exploiting existing 
loopholes in the software to instead hack into the smartphone.124 
The critical difference between the two, as will be explained in 
this Section, is that while the first method is more akin to having 
a skeleton key for any house, the second is more like being locked 
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out and having to pick the lock with a bobby pin or breaking a 
window to get inside a single house. Given this difference, two 
threshold issues arise: first, gaining the assistance of a technology 
company to create the skeleton key, and second, working around 
the privacy concerns raised by intruding into an otherwise private 
space. 
Extraordinary access, sometimes called exceptional access, 
has been referred to as a “backdoor” for the government.125 The 
access is characterized as extraordinary and exceptional because 
the government would only use the tool to access targeted phones 
as opposed to a more dragnet type of data collection.126 Though 
there are several ways to accomplish this, the basic idea is to 
provide the government a way to access data on an encrypted 
smartphone without having to resort to other more intensive 
methods.127 To illustrate, a government can push a software 
update to the targeted iPhone to remove the encryption code 
altogether.128 Alternatively, a technology company can build 
intentional vulnerabilities into its software for all its devices to 
then provide special permissions to the appropriate law 
enforcement agencies.129 
Backdoors provide the government with a long-term solution 
to the problem of encrypted smartphones because they would 
allow for an investigating law enforcement official to access the 
information without incurring additional expenses. A backdoor 
would have saved the FBI the US$1.3 million it reportedly spent 
on unlocking Syed Farook’s iPhone.130 That said, to use a 
backdoor, the government would need cooperation from the 
technology company, who would then have to alter the 
encryption code to provide a law enforcement official backdoor 
access to the phone. But, technology companies are resistant to 
providing the government with backdoor access that could 
effectively be used to decrypt any smartphone.131 Doing so gives 
rise to serious cybersecurity and privacy implications because 
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providing a backdoor weakens any encrypted ensured security.132 
Backdoors can undermine the security of encryption measures 
and leave smartphones vulnerable to malicious third parties like 
hackers or foreign nations.133 Thus, without voluntary 
cooperation from the technology company, a government would 
have to use its existing legal framework or amend the relevant 
provisions to compel the company into providing the requested 
technical assistance.134 
In contrast to extraordinary access, the government can use 
its own resources or hire a third-party to “lawfully hack” the 
encryption code without the technical assistance from the 
technology company.135 The hacking is considered lawful because 
the action is authorized by the government, regardless of who 
ultimately does the hacking.136 Technology companies themselves 
do not engage in lawful hacking because it would undermine 
their claims that their devices are secure.137 Rather than installing 
a backdoor, lawful hacking exploits existing vulnerabilities on the 
phone.138 This could mean that the hacker identifies a loophole 
in the encryption code that would allow him to bypass the security 
measures.139 It also could refer to less complex methods by using 
brute-force methods and trying thousands of password 
combinations to gain access into the encrypted device.140 Using 
the analogy above, lawful hacking can include anything from 
wiggling a loose doorknob until it falls off or using more forceful 
methods like smashing in a window to gain entry into the house. 
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Unlike backdoor access, which would create a key to every phone, 
lawful hacking compromises only its target.141 
Lawful hacking is a short-term solution to the problem of 
encrypted smartphones because a government is forced to 
expend time and money on a case-by-case basis.142 Instead of 
having the capability of accessing every phone as it needs to, a law 
enforcement agency must be more selective in the phones it 
targets. Governments are hesitant to use lawful hacking because 
it often requires hiring a third-party skilled in decryption who can 
demand a high price tag for the service.143 Or, if the government 
were to use its own resources, it may instead encounter delays on 
otherwise time-sensitive matters.144 In short, what is gained by 
using lawful hacking—bypassing the need for cooperation from 
the technology company—comes with a price, and efforts are 
limited only to specific devices given the increased cost and 
longer wait times.  
These complications regarding lawful hacking, 
consequently, limit the government from gaining access to every 
phone. Still, consumers rely on devices promising strong 
encryption measures to secure personal information from prying 
eyes (including those of the government). Those who value 
privacy as a method of control and protection from government 
surveillance may want to use encryption to minimize against 
government abuses.145 For these individuals, lawful hacking 
undermines the privacy guaranteed by encryption measures, 
especially when the information collected from the hacking goes 
beyond what is reasonable. The reaction from the Snowden 
disclosures, for example, demonstrates that even authorized 
hacking can pervasively intrude upon an individual’s sphere of 
privacy.146 In critiquing the role of lawful hacking in the global 
Encryption Debate, the legal implications center more around 
the privacy expectations of the average user.147 
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This tension between encryption and legitimate government 
interests is global.148 Mobile phones are ubiquitous, with a 
significant number of devices capable of collecting vast amounts 
of data about its user.149 Apple, in particular, is one of the largest 
providers of smartphones with full disk encryption, and as of 2017 
holds approximately thirteen percent of the global market 
running iOS 8 or higher.150 In the United States, approximately 
forty-four percent of all mobile devices run iOS.151 Moreover, as 
explained earlier, the different types of crime are not limited to 
one area of the world, and because of this, countries may mirror 
each other with the laws they ultimately enact to regulate the use 
of encryption.152 Underlying the Encryption Debate is the 
awareness that however the debate is tackled in each country, that 
choice affects the global community. 
III. DISCUSSION OF THE LEGAL INTERNATIONAL 
LANDSCAPE 
Several countries have attempted to address these two issues 
in their respective legal frameworks. This Part focuses on the 
approaches adopted by the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, 
and China. In addition to being the most vocal on the debate, 
these countries provide benchmarks on balancing the interests of 
law enforcement and those of technology companies and privacy 
advocates. The United Kingdom and Australia are members of 
the Five-Eyes Alliance (“FVEY”)—countries that place a high 
value on developing tools and improving international 
coordination in addressing transnational crime.153 Germany, in 
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contrast, prioritizes user privacy above state interests. Last, China 
provides a unique perspective on the Debate by instead choosing 
to minimize the influence of technology companies and foreign 
states. 
A. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom passed explicit laws governing law 
enforcement’s relationship with data and encryption: the 2016 
Investigatory Powers Act (“IPA”)154 and the 2018 Data Protection 
Act (“DPA”).155 The IPA instructs law enforcement agencies on 
when they can compel technology companies to facilitate 
encrypted data access and when they can use lawful hacking 
methods. The DPA, on the other hand, regulates law 
enforcement agencies’ collection and processing of personal 
data. Both laws are relatively recent and UK courts have yet to 
fully implement either act. Thus, interpretive guidance on both 
laws is sparse. 
1. The Investigatory Powers Act 
The 2016 IPA provides the legal framework that governs a 
law enforcement agency’s power to investigate crime.156 The IPA 
was meant to consolidate existing powers into a comprehensive 
resource, but its passage brought out concerns about the 
potential for arbitrary and pervasive use.157 The investigative 
methods that some provisions authorize are highly intrusive in 
nature and necessitate securing authorization from both the 
Secretary of State and an independent judge prior to their use.158 
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Further, the IPA can only be used to investigate serious crimes.159 
Serious crimes are defined to be those that carry a prison 
sentence of twelve months.160 Last, the IPA sustains broad 
coverage and applies to foreign companies that conduct business 
in the United Kingdom.161 
Section 253 of the IPA allows the government to compel 
technology companies to assist in accessing decrypted data.162 
Under the IPA, law enforcement agencies must secure a warrant 
before they can serve a technical capability notice (“TCN”) on a 
telecommunications operator.163 After securing the warrant, the 
TCN can be used to compel technology companies to remove 
protections on the sought data.164 The demand for extraordinary 
access comes from statutory language, which imposes 
“obligations relating to the removal by a relevant operator of 
electronic protection applied by or on behalf of that operator to 
any communications or data.”165 Though TCNs can be deployed 
to compel decryption by companies who may already have 
encryption keys for their products, it is unclear whether they can 
be used to compel companies without such keys, like Apple,166 for 
whom decryption would require redesigning their systems to 
comply with the notice.167 Additionally, a TCN can be used to 
compel companies to install a “permanent interception 
capability” which ensures future access to encrypted data.168 This 
provision has yet to be invoked.169 
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Part 5 of the IPA authorizes “lawful hacking” by law 
enforcement agencies.170 Like the requirements for extraordinary 
access, a law enforcement agency must secure a warrant before it 
can hack into the device.171 Under this provision, the government 
issues targeted equipment interference warrants.172 Warrants can 
be served on either the equipment owner or on an operator to 
assist in decrypting the data.173 Law enforcement can use these 
warrants to access all types of data on a phone including 
communications data, speech, music, sounds, and images.174 
Unlike the TCN, equipment interference warrants can only be 
used on devices that law enforcement agencies reasonably believe 
contain information vital to national security interests or are 
related to the objective of investigating and solving a serious 
crime.175 
To determine whether law enforcement can use either 
provision of the IPA, the warrant issuer must evaluate whether the 
government’s objective in doing so is important and legitimate.176 
This is a low bar and turns on the type of crime the IPA is being 
used to address.177 Once the agency passes this bar, the IPA must 
be implemented according to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.178 The necessity principle requires courts to 
consider whether there are less intrusive measures available to the 
government.179 The proportionality principle requires courts to 
consider whether the government’s proposed actions are 
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal, i.e. whether the 
implicated right would be limited any more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective.180 The “necessity and proportionality” 
analysis is meant as a procedural safeguard given the potential for 
government abuse.181 
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2. The Data Protection Act & Privacy Expectations for Mobile 
Data 
Privacy expectations in the United Kingdom come from 
different sectors of the law,182 like that in the United States.183 In 
Wainwright v Home Office,184 the House of Lords held that there is 
no general right to privacy in English common law.185 Rather, 
parties seeking to make claims based on a violation of privacy 
must seek recourse from other legislation.186 The Data Protection 
Act of 2018 is the latest piece of legislation in the UK data 
protection legal regime, and the primary piece of legislation used 
for claims alleging intrusion of privacy of personal data. Though 
most of the law is the United Kingdom’s implementation of the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), the relevant 
DPA provision for this Note adopts European Directive 
2016/680.187 Part 3 of the DPA dictates how law enforcement 
agencies collect and process data. 
There are six data protection principles that must be met for 
a law enforcement agency to apply when processing data: 
• Processing be lawful and fair; 
• The purposes of processing be specified, explicit and 
legitimate; 
• Personal data be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive; 
• Personal data be accurate and kept up to date; 
• Personal data be kept no longer than is necessary; 
and 
• Personal data be processed in a secure manner.188 
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Individuals whose data is being collected have rights such as: 
the right to knowledge of how the data is being processed; the 
right to rectify inaccurate data, the right to the erasure or 
restriction of data “where the processing of the data would 
infringe the data protection principles,” and rights related to 
automated decision-making.”189 Lastly, these individuals’ rights 
can be limited, but only where necessary and proportionate.190 
Though the DPA is intended to be the United Kingdom’s 
local implementation of the GDPR, the adoption of EU Directive 
2016/680 through Part 3 was meant to ensure that even public 
officials such as law enforcement officers exercise caution in 
collecting and processing data.191 The first principle, for example, 
recognizes that not all data collection is essential and law 
enforcement must show that the data could not be accessed by 
some other less intrusive means.192 The third principle likewise 
requires that the data collected is adequate and limited to only 
what is necessary—the DPA does not permit a broad collection 
and retention of collected data.193 Last, any data processing is 
subject to a “necessity and proportionality” analysis and must be 
applied to any law enforcement action conducted pursuant to the 
IPA.194 
3. Application of the UK Legal Regime to Encrypted 
Smartphones 
British citizens expressed displeasure about the IPA even 
before its passage, and referred to it as the “Snoopers’ Charter” 
because of the expansive power given to the government to 
collect and investigate private and sensitive data from 
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smartphones.195 The IPA stands starkly in contrast to the DPA, 
which promises a reasonable expectation of privacy from law 
enforcement and government surveillance. Both acts utilize a 
necessity and proportionality test to determine whether the access 
at issue is justified. 
Whether it is used to secure information about a terrorist 
network or to gather information about a drug deal, gathering 
evidence in criminal investigations is an important and legitimate 
state objective. This objective surpasses the low threshold 
required by the IPA. A law enforcement agency that wants to 
lawfully hack into a phone must determine first whether there are 
less intrusive measures available to gain access. Given the amount 
of time and money it costs to access the phone, it is likely a warrant 
issuer will determine that there are no less intrusive measures 
available to gather the desired information. Further, these same 
reasons suggest that the government’s proposed actions are 
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Lastly, the principles 
articulated in the DPA serve as a bulwark against overbroad 
searches. Law enforcement can only collect and retain essential 
data and must dispose of anything non-essential. Seemingly, in 
the United Kingdom, a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
is protected by procedural safeguards that ensure that only 
relevant data is being collected and investigated. 
B. Australia 
Though an established member of the FVEY security and 
global surveillance alliance, Australia has the newest set of laws in 
the Encryption Debate.196 Thus far, Australian federal law on 
encryption and privacy rights in the digital age is largely 
controlled by a single piece of legislation: the 2018 
Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment 
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(Assistance and Access) Bill (“AAB”).197 The law acts similarly to 
the UK laws because it explicitly requires communications and 
service providers to develop new capabilities to intercept 
communications, authorizes a law enforcement agency to hack 
into the device, and requires foreign companies to comply when 
operating in Australia.198 However, unlike the UK, Australia does 
not have a federal statutory scheme that protects individuals from 
overbroad law enforcement surveillance. Instead, that protection 
comes from state governments, though only one state has so-far 
acted in providing such protections.199 
1. The Assistance and Access Bill 
The AAB created a procedural mechanism whereby law 
enforcement must go through proper channels before issuing a 
technology capability notice on any entity that provides online 
services or communications equipment in Australia.200 This law 
functions similarly to the UK’s IPA, and evokes many of the same 
concerns. TCNs may compel a company to either use existing 
capabilities to remove electronic protection or install new 
capabilities to do so.201 The type of help that a law enforcement 
agency can request from a technology company is outlined in 
Schedule 1 (“Industry Assistance”) and the warrant process is 
explained in Schedule 2 (“Computer Access Warrants”).202 
Though parts of the bill suggest otherwise, the Australian 
government, through the inclusion of Section 317ZG, remains 
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resolute that the bill cannot and will not be used to compel 
companies to provide extraordinary access by creating backdoors 
because this would undermine information security.203 Instead, 
the technical assistance must be “reasonable, proportionate, 
practicable and technically feasible.”204 The technical assistance 
cannot remove existing electronic protection.205 Additionally, the 
AAB can only be used on crimes that have a maximum penalty of 
at least three years imprisonment or more, which effectively 
precludes the use of the law for lesser offenses.206 For the 
Australian government, compelling companies to provide 
technical assistance in retrieving data from smartphones is 
justified by the legitimate need of law enforcement to solve 
crime.207 The country, however, draws the line at modifying 
technology such that it would weaken the security system of the 
device.208 
2. Australian Expectations of Privacy 
Australia does not have one comprehensive law discussing 
privacy—rather, like the UK, an Australian citizen’s right to 
privacy is inferred from an amalgamation of federal, state, and 
territory laws.209 The Australia federal government has not 
codified any protections from government surveillance, and 
instead such protections have come from individual states. At 
least two states, New South Wales and Queensland, provide some 
insight into how Australian law might address the issues proposed 
by the Encryption Debate. Given the state-based nature of privacy 
protections and the recency of the digital privacy legislation, it is 
unknown how exactly these interplay with the AAB. 
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New South Wales uses the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act of 2002 (“LEPRA”)210 as the primary 
protection against unlawful police action. LEPRA Section 30 
comes closest to addressing the search of a mobile phone during 
a police encounter and states in relevant part, “In conducting the 
search of a person, a police officer may . . . (c) examine anything 
in the possession of the person, and . . . (e) do any other thing 
authorized by this Act for the purposes of the search.”211 This 
provision could be interpreted to allow a police officer to search 
a cell phone, though it is not explicit in the text whether this type 
of search was contemplated by the NSW legislature when it passed 
the Act in 2002. 
Queensland, on the other hand, has substantial statutory 
authority and case law elaborating when law enforcement can 
access data on a lawfully seized smartphone. The Police Powers 
and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (the “PPRA”) dictates the 
contours of lawful searches and seizures.212 The PPRA recognizes 
two types of situations necessitating lawful hacking: 1) when the 
perpetrator’s identity is known and 2) when an unknown phone 
is recovered from a crime scene.213 In both instances, the targeted 
phone must be linked to a crime, which provides sufficient 
justification to secure a warrant to hack into the phone. The 
PPRA discusses two types of warrants issued to allow law 
enforcement to access the data on a locked smartphone.214 
Section 154 warrants are issued when the phone owner’s 
identity is known.215 The warrant compels the owner to provide 
information necessary to access the phone.216 Failure to provide 
such information is a crime, the penalty for which is two to five-
years imprisonment.217 Though this raises concerns of self-
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incrimination, Australia does not recognize a right against self-
incrimination in the way that the United States does.218 
A Section 178A warrant is issued for phones discovered or 
seized from a crime scene, and where the owner’s identity is 
unknown.219 The warrant authorizes law enforcement to use 
whatever means reasonably necessary to access the data.220 Case 
law on this second type of warrant is scant, but the concerns raised 
in case law about Section 154 warrants are just as present under 
this circumstance. The Supreme Court of Queensland recognized 
the qualitative value of iPhone evidence and advised law 
enforcement to exercise caution in gathering that data.221 It was 
concerned with overly intrusive and pervasive government power 
and permitted lawful hacking provided that the law enforcement 
agency follows all procedures, so that lawful hacking does not 
raise any privacy concerns.222  
In interpreting the PPRA, Queensland courts have cited to 
US Fourth Amendment caselaw. In R v N,223 the Supreme Court 
of Queensland discussed the privacy concerns articulated in Riley 
v. California.224 In relevant part, the Queensland Court advised 
exercising caution around mobile phones, saying “because of 
their large storage capacity and broader privacy implications, 
iPhones differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from other 
documentary records.”225 Given that the Queensland court looks 
to the United States for guidance on finding the balance between 
law enforcement interests and privacy rights, this indicates that 
the Australia court could come out the same way as the United 
States on whether lawful hacking unreasonably infringes any 
privacy rights. Even though the Australian federal government 
does not have a federal law that protects its citizens’ privacy from 
government surveillance, at least some citizens can seek recourse 
in states that passed legislation to fill the gap. Thus, Queensland 
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provides some insight into how other Australian jurisdictions may 
address lawful hacking and expectations of privacy. 
C. Germany 
Germany stands apart from the other countries discussed in 
this Note because of both its strict stance against backdoors and 
its more protective view of information privacy rights.226 Germany 
is not representative of the European Union, nor is it the only 
European nation with a stake in the Debate.227 As a leading 
member of the European Union, Germany was instrumental in 
the enactment of the GDPR, which provides broad data and 
privacy protections.228 This follows from it holding itself out as a 
leader in encryption.229 Germany endorses wide encryption use 
and encourages the development of encryption technology, 
despite the impediment to a law enforcement agency’s ability to 
gain access to data.230 The Snowden disclosures reinforced 
domestic views that the government had a responsibility to 
promote and protect infrastructures that secured the data of 
German citizens and companies.231 As recently as 2017, German 
officials identified five guiding principles for its policy on 
encryption: 
1. There will be no ban or limitation on encryption products. 
2. Encryption products shall be tested for their security in 
order to increase the user’s trust in those products. 
3. The development of encryption products by German 
manufacturers is essential for the country’s security and for 
 
226. See generally Sven Herpig & Stefan Heumann, The Encryption Debate in Germany, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (May 30, 2019), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debate-in-germany-pub-
79215 [https://perma.cc/3KGL-MPAF]. 
227. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 170 (discussing the Debate in France). 
228. See Natasha Singer, The Next Privacy Battle in Europe is Over This New Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/technology/europe-
eprivacy-regulation-battle.html [https://perma.cc/9TDB-SAL9]; Shackelford, supra 
note 10, at 905-06. 
229. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 186; see also Bhairav Acharya et al., Deciphering 
the European Encryption Debate: Germany, OPEN TECH. INST. 2 (Jan. 2018); see Herpig & 
Heumann, supra note 226, at 2.  
230. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 186 (outlining the principles); see also Herpig 
& Heumann, supra note 226. 
231. Herpig & Heumann, supra note 226, at 2. 
2021] APPLE, THE GOVERNMENT, AND YOU 809 
those companies’ ability to compete internationally, and shall 
therefore be strengthened. 
4. Law enforcement and security agencies shall not be 
weakened by the widespread use of encryption. The 
development of additional technical competencies for those 
agencies shall be fostered. 
5. International cooperation on encryption issues such as 
open standards and interoperability is vital and shall be 
fostered bi- and multilaterally.232 
These principles suggest that though the country recognizes 
the need of law enforcement agencies to access that data, it will 
not compromise its position on encryption. Thus, discussing 
Germany’s approach to the debate is crucial in understanding the 
spectrum of options from which the United States can adopt. 
1. Lawful Hacking in Germany 
Germany explicitly bans extraordinary access and will not 
compel technology companies to modify their code.233 The 
country embraces encryption and permits lawful hacking 
methods instead.234 There are two legal bases for law enforcement 
to utilize. Germany’s Code of Criminal Procedure (“StPO”) 
contains several relevant provisions: Section 100a permits law 
enforcement to hack devices because it facilitates the interception 
of communications, and Sections 94 and 98 permit hacking into 
lawfully seized information systems, such as smartphones.235 The 
second basis is the Criminal Police Office Act (“BKAG”): Section 
20k permits law enforcement officers to covertly access 
information systems and to collect data that is important to a 
case.236 Law enforcement officers must secure a warrant from a 
court prior to engaging in hacking, and such warrants can only 
be issued for serious crimes, for example, when there is an 
impending danger to a person’s life or for national security 
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purposes.237 Law enforcement officers can bypass the warrant 
requirement if there is imminent danger of harm.238 Last, law 
enforcement officers are prohibited from collecting information 
on “core areas” and are required to delete the information if 
accidentally collected.239 
2. The Fundamental Right to Privacy 
Germany’s viewpoint on the Encryption Debate is largely 
informed by its robust protection of the fundamental right to 
information privacy.240 One scholar speculates that Germany’s 
recent history and experience as a formerly oppressive regime 
that engaged in massive surveillance makes the current 
government hesitant to implement any laws that might 
counteract its progress.241 In contrast, others, including a former 
justice of the Federal Constitution Court (Germany’s highest 
court), argue that the protection of fundamental rights from 
pervasive government intrusion predates the modern state of 
Germany and has always been an intrinsic part of its ethos.242 In 
either case, Germany, more than the other countries discussed in 
this Note, places a high value on the right to privacy. 
The Federal Constitution Court held on two separate 
occasions that overbroad lawful hacking provisions threaten the 
general right of personality, “which includes the fundamental 
right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of 
information technology systems.”243 In a 2008 ruling, the court 
struck down a provision that would have compelled technology 
 
237. See id. 
238. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 189. 
239. Acharya et al., supra note 229, at 3-4. Core areas are those that are highly 
private areas for the individual and includes communications between close family 
members and with lawyers, doctors, and the clergy. Id. at 4. 
240. See id. at 2. 
241. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 192; see also Herpig & Heumann, supra note 
226, at 3 (“Because of unique historical experiences with surveillance during Nazi rule 
and the East German Communist regime, the German intelligence community does not 
enjoy the positive public image that those in the United States and the United Kingdom 
do, and thus usually adopts a very low profile in public debates.”). 
242. See Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But 
Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 291 (2012); Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, The Principle 
of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 34 HUM. RTS. 
L.J. 12, 12 (2014). 
243. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 188. 
2021] APPLE, THE GOVERNMENT, AND YOU 811 
companies to code backdoors in its devices because it would go 
against the government’s responsibility to ensure the safety and 
integrity of its information technology systems.244 In 2016, the 
Federal Constitutional Court struck down another provision 
finding that the present mechanisms for lawful hacking were 
“overly broad, lacked sufficiently independent oversight, and did 
not provide sufficient protections for the core area of private 
life.”245 The cases found that the right to privacy was a key factor 
in determining the outer boundaries of lawful hacking.246 
Further, in identifying that privacy was a fundamental right, the 
court applied the Principle of Proportionality to strike down the 
problematic provisions.247 
The Principle of Proportionality demands that law 
enforcement powers that severely interfere with privacy must be 
sufficiently limited to the protection of weighty law enforcement 
interests.248 The Principle of Proportionality is similar to the 
proportionality test applied in the United Kingdom and the 
balancing tests applied in Australia.249 In applying the Principle, 
the Court considers three factors in its proportionality test: first, 
whether the act under scrutiny appropriately promotes its stated 
objective; second, whether it is necessary to promote that 
objective; and third, whether the act is adequate or proportionate 
in response to the need it addresses.250 
Applying the three-factor proportionality test, German 
courts are likely to find that without any procedural safeguards to 
place a check on law enforcement agencies, lawful hacking of 
encrypted iPhones severely interferes with privacy rights. First, the 
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legal bases are appropriate in promoting its objective but risks 
being overbroad if the law enforcement official does not take care 
to sufficiently limit its use of that power when collecting data. The 
relevant acts permit a law enforcement agency to collect data but 
do not detail how that law enforcement agency would then 
process that data.251 Moreover, in the two above mentioned cases 
brought before the Federal Constitutional Court, the Court was 
concerned with lack of independent oversight.252 Use of either 
the StPO or the BKAG as the legal basis for hacking into an 
encrypted iPhone risk failing the first factor in the Principle of 
Proportionality. These acts fail because they do not provide 
sufficient details on whether there is independent oversight of the 
data collection and processing. The Federal Constitution Court 
might be more receptive to lawful hacking if the data collection 
were pursuant to the same oversight to which British law 
enforcement are subject in the DPA. Second, whether it is 
necessary to hack into encrypted devices depends on the 
circumstances of the crime at issue. The Federal Constitutional 
Court has indicated that the interests to protect the “life, limb, 
and freedom of the individual,”253 the continued existence of the 
German state, and the continued existence of the human species 
are legitimate reasons.254 Within this designation, many law 
enforcement interests are legitimate, given that a law 
enforcement agency’s duty is the protection of its citizens. Third, 
whether the act in question is adequate or proportionate in 
response to the need also turns on the circumstances of crime. 
The Federal Constitutional Court might find use of the StPO or 
the BKAG justified for national security reasons but less so when 
the acts are applied to crimes of lesser degree, such as the murder 
of a local individual. 
Though the two cases above concerned law enforcement 
officers addressing only national security interests, it is likely the 
Federal Constitutional Court will continue to apply this reasoning 
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in the future to any lawful hacking case alleging a fundamental 
privacy violation. Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia, 
German citizens retain high expectations of privacy for the data 
on their phones, and have consistently indicated that expectation 
when propounding pro-encryption polices. Thus, even within the 
boundaries created so far by the German legislature and judiciary, 
lawful hacking may not one day be a tool available to law 
enforcement. Like the United States, Germany considers privacy 
rights against government surveillance a fundamental right 
enshrined in its foundational laws.255 Though there are two ways 
for law enforcement to lawfully hack and intercept 
communications at present, the decisions of the Federal 
Constitution Court suggest that it is hesitant to extend these 
powers when lawfully hacking encrypted smartphones reveals 
more information than to which a law enforcement agency is 
privy. Unlike the other jurisdictions discussed in this Note, 
Germany chooses privacy over national security interests. 
D. China 
The final jurisdiction this Note discusses is China, whose role 
in the Encryption Debate stands apart from the others because of 
the country’s distinctive motivations for its use of encryption 
technology. The Snowden disclosures prompted its leadership to 
reduce the country’s dependency on foreign companies.256 China 
was concerned that the United States would continue to 
manipulate US-based technologies to surveil those within Chinese 
borders.257 Hence, China’s government seeks to limit the use of 
surveillance technology by foreign countries within its borders, 
which stands in contrast to its own stance on using surveillance 
technology on its citizens,258 prompting some to characterize 
China as a surveillance state.259 Many Chinese citizens are 
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increasingly demanding their information privacy rights,260 a 
demand that has intensified as their government implements new 
technologies that collect private information for monitoring 
purposes.261 China’s actions thus far suggest two conclusions with 
regard to the Encryption Debate. First, that it can and has 
compelled technology companies to be compliant with laws 
requiring technical assistance to encrypted devices. Second, that 
lawful hacking does not implicate any existing privacy rights. 
1. China’s Development of Encryption Technologies 
In direct response to the Snowden disclosures, the Chinese 
government reinitiated efforts to strengthen its cybersecurity 
infrastructure to withstand spying and attacks from foreign 
governments,262 though its interest in encrypted information 
predates the disclosures.263 China has invested heavily in 
developing secure encryption technologies, and tasked several 
government agencies to research, test, and promulgate standards 
for encryption related issues.264 These efforts are aimed at 
developing domestic encryption technology while reducing the 
use and influence of foreign encryption technology,265 resulting 
in several laws that impose strict obligations on foreign companies 
seeking to do business in China. 
China, as early as 2003, required that all wireless devices sold 
in the country comply with the WLAN Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure (“WAPI”) standard, claiming it to be more secure 
that others at the time.266 Despite heavy pushback from US-based 
technology companies, eventually some complied, with Apple 
introducing iPhone models that met the WAPI standard.267 The 
FBI speculated that these early models essentially came with 
 
260. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 7. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 1. 
263. See Segal, supra note 257, at 2. 
264. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 3. 
265. Id. at 4. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 5 (“Despite these setbacks, Apple and Dell both eventually introduced 
phone models that support Wifi and WAPI, a sign of the Chinese government’s successful 
ability to leverage market access to shape the behavior of foreign companies”). China 
later discarded the mandate after facing substantial foreign pressure. Id. at 8. 
2021] APPLE, THE GOVERNMENT, AND YOU 815 
backdoors for the Chinese government.268 China regularly 
updated its laws to keep up with the change in technology, with 
each law reaffirming the obligation to comply with domestic 
encryption polices. The 2015 Counterterrorism Law,269 for 
example, imposes on telecommunication operators a 
requirement to provide technical support and decryption services 
to Chinese authorities for public security and intelligence 
gathering purposes.270 A previous version of the law included 
language that effectively imposed a backdoor requirement on all 
technology companies.271 China, however, removed that language 
after severe criticism from the international community, 
including from the United States.272 
The 2017 Cybersecurity Law273 further requires technology 
companies to keep a record of users’ online activities for at least 
six months.274 Section 41, in particular, emphasizes that network 
operators, which is broadly defined to include Apple, must 
provide technical support and assistance during law enforcement 
investigations.275 Chinese press have interpreted these provisions 
as comparable to the United Kingdom’s IPA and Australia’s 
AAB.276 To comply with the Cybersecurity Law, Apple migrated its 
iCloud data to a local Chinese cloud service277 and transferred the 
encryption keys for the cloud data to Chinese authorities.278 
Important to note, this was data to which Apple was already 
privy,279 unlike data that can be recovered from end-to-end 
encrypted communications or from iPhones secured with device 
encryption. Thus, Apple’s compliance here does not undermine 
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its argument that it does not have a decryption key to otherwise 
encrypted data. Interestingly, China banned several end-to-end 
encrypted communication services, with the sole exception being 
Apple’s iMessage.280 Apple has also acquiesced to demands for 
app removal from the App Store, including an app that 
purportedly helped Hong Kong protestors target police officers 
and other privacy-protecting VPN apps.281 
On October 26, 2019, China passed the newest iteration of 
its encryption regulatory regime, the Encryption Law.282 The law 
classifies encryption uses into three categories—core encryption, 
ordinary encryption, and commercial encryption—and 
articulates that while core encryption and ordinary encryption are 
used for guarding safe secrets, commercial encryption is not.283 
The law does not provide a definition of what constitutes 
commercial encryption (leaving open the question whether 
consumer devices like iPhones fall into that category) though it is 
thought to alleviate some of the burdens imposed by previous 
laws.284 
In any case, in spite of the ambiguities in China’s laws on 
encryption, Apple’s compliance thus far with Chinese laws and 
regulations suggests that it will not resist future efforts to regulate 
encryption measures, including the requirement to provide a 
backdoor into encrypted smartphones. Though this seems odd 
given that in other jurisdictions Apple has resisted such efforts, its 
yielding to Chinese demands is more reasonable when dealing 
with a market saturated with competitors capable of providing 
encryption capabilities on their devices.285 Yet, even Chinese 
technology companies have resisted against China’s requests. A 
Chinese ride-sharing company, for example, refused a law 
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enforcement request for data to be used in investigating the 
murder of passengers.286 Huawei, the dominant smartphone 
manufacturer in China,287 indicated it had reservations about a 
backdoor requirement when it expressed its support for Apple in 
the 2015 legal fight with the FBI.288 Chinese internet giants, 
Alibaba and Tencent, pushed back against government requests 
for data, explaining that such interference harms their expansion 
into the global market.289 Unlike its battles in other jurisdictions, 
Apple has the benefit of being backed by foreign nations and 
other dominant technology companies when pressured to comply 
with harsh Chinese laws. 
2. China as a Surveillance State 
In addition to developing domestic encryption technologies 
in response to perceived threats from foreign nations and 
companies, China’s investment in domestic products arises from 
otherwise lacking data protection for its citizens.290 A significant 
number of Chinese citizens are victims of data leaks, with their 
data contributing to a thriving black market.291 China does not 
have a single privacy and data protection law, and like the UK, 
develops its privacy protections piecemeal.292 In response to lack 
of data protection laws, the country in 2018 published the 
Personal Information Security Specification, a nonbinding 
standard that is meant to induce technology companies into 
providing stronger encryption measures on their smartphones.293 
The Cybersecurity Law, likewise, was passed in response to the 
threat from third parties seeking unauthorized access to 
 
286. Sacks, supra note 283. 
287. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 214. 
288. See Segal, supra note 257, at 9; Caroline Hyde, China’s Huawei Backs Apple Stance 
in Phone Unlocking Dispute, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-22/china-s-huawei-backs-apple-
stance-in-phone-unlocking-dispute [https://perma.cc/AW8Q-KAG9]. 
289. Samm Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-what-
expect [https://perma.cc/L5WU-VVKN] [hereinafter Sacks, Cybersecurity]. 
290. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 7. 
291. See id. 
292. See Samuel Yang, China: Privacy, GLOB. DATA REV. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://globaldatareview.com/insight/handbook/2021/article/china-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/JNT6-N7R2]. 
293. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 20, at 7. 
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consumer data.294 Since its passage, the Cybersecurity Law serves 
as the government’s main piece of legislation for data protection 
and control.295 
Though these laws suggest China respects the privacy of its 
citizens, that respect does not extend to privacy from government 
surveillance.296 The provisions imposing strict obligations on 
technology companies to assist with law enforcement 
investigations and efforts apply to all companies operating within 
Chinese borders, not just foreign ones. More, its development of 
a social credit system undermines any claims that it seeks to secure 
the privacy and confidential information of its citizens.297 
Many consumers worldwide have experienced a variation of 
the social credit system: a credit score based on debt repayment, 
the ratings given by Uber and similar ridesharing companies, and 
even likes and comments received on an Instagram post.298 The 
system bears an eerie resemblance to the Black Mirror299 episode 
where individuals rank every social interaction with each other 
and rankings directly contribute to a person’s standing in 
society.300 The idea of quantifying a person’s action to either 
reward or penalize them is not a new one, and here, once the 
system is fully implemented, the idea will be applied on a much 
larger and more formal scale.301 At present, only some local 
governments have pilot programs in place, with each program 
 
294. See Yang, supra note 292. 
295. See Sacks, supra note 283. 
296. See Segal, supra note 257, at 10. 
297. Nicole Kobie, The complicated truth about China’s social credit system, WIRED MAG. 
(June 7, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained 
[https://perma.cc/X9RV-T7A6]. 
298. Id. 
299. Black Mirror is a science fiction anthology show in which the issue of each 
standalone episode revolves around a piece of technology and its effects on the 
characters' lives. See NETFLIX https://www.netflix.com/title/70264888 
[https://perma.cc/6LXV-FKD7] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).  
300. Black Mirror: Nosedive, NETFLIX (Oct. 21, 2016); Sophie Gilbert, Black Mirror’s 
‘Nosedive’ Skewers Social Media, ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/10/black-mirror-nosedive-
review-season-three-netflix/504668/ [https://perma.cc/TVJ3-YMK9]. 
301. See Kobie, supra note 297 (“The idea itself is not a Chinese phenomenon . . . 
But if the Chinese system does come together as envisioned, it would still be something 
very unique. It’s both unique and part of a global trend.”). 
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varying from the next.302 One city, for example, starts all residents 
at 1,000 points and makes deductions for bad behavior and 
additions for good behavior.303 Tracking everyday behavior is 
made easier with the widespread use of facial recognition 
technology and data sharing between companies.304 China 
justifies the use of such a system to build trust, enforce laws, and 
hold bad actors accountable.305 It frames the system as way to 
further protect its citizens from those who would maliciously use 
personal information and provides individuals with an alternative 
means of building financial credit.306 If anything, the social credit 
system falls within the purview of China’s goal to increase data 
protection for its citizens by using new technologies in its 
governance scheme.307 
Between laws requiring technology companies to provide 
technical assistance and the increased use of surveillance schemes 
such as the social credit system, Chinese citizens do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for the data on their 
smartphones. Law enforcement agencies can access digital 
communications given that encryption is virtually not allowed on 
most services in the country, and the robust development of 
encryption technology largely overcomes potential barriers in 
hacking the phone. Not only does China endorse lawful hacking, 
it actively strives to ensure access to that data. Thus, though it has 
concerns when other unauthorized persons gain access to its 
citizens’ data, China itself holds carte blanche to all 
communications and data. 
 
302. Id.; Louise Matsakis, How the West Got China’s Social Credit Wrong, WIRED MAG. 
(July 29, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QGV-XSK9]. 
303. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302. 
304. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302. Those with a deficit of 
social credit face restrictions on their choices and movements. Likewise, those with a 
positive rating gain access to discounts, benefits, and other rewards from the 
government. Id. 
305. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302. 
306. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302. 
307. Eunsun Cho, The Social Credit System: Not Just Another Chinese Idiosyncrasy, J. PUB. 
& INT’L AFFAIRS, https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/social-credit-system-not-just-another-
chinese-idiosyncrasy [https://perma.cc/GY9N-ZR3Y] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
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IV. UNITED STATES 
The Encryption Debate in the United States is arguably the 
most notable of all the countries discussed in this Note, primarily 
because of the divisive split in public opinion when the US 
government first requested a court order to compel Apple to 
assist FBI agents in accessing the data on a suspected terrorist’s 
phone.308 The debate at the time largely focused on the first issue, 
whether the US government could use the All Writs Act 
(“AWA”)309 to compel a technology company like Apple to build 
a backdoor into its smartphone. Within two weeks of each other, 
two separate federal courts issued contradictory orders on the 
limits of the AWA as applied to the circumstances of this 
Debate.310 US courts throughout the country have entertained 
several similar suits, yet none have made it to the Supreme 
Court.311 In addition to the concerns raised by the first issue, some 
commentators have speculated about whether the Fourth 
Amendment limits the government from hacking into an 
encrypted smartphone.312 Unlike the first issue, the Supreme 
 
308. See Krisnadev Calamur, Public Opinion Supports Apple Over the FBI—or Does It?, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbi-polls/470736/ 
[https://perma.cc/BD42-U2W2]; Dustin Volz & Abhirup Roy, U.S. government, Apple take 
encryption case to court of public opinion, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-commission/u-s-government-
apple-take-encryption-case-to-court-of-public-opinion-idUSKCN0VV185 
[https://perma.cc/68NB-4SHE]; Tracey Lien, Whether Apple or FBI is winning the PR war 
depends on which poll you’re looking at, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-fbi-polls-20160224-
story.html. The case drew considerable attention from technology moguls and advocates. 
See Amicus Briefs in Support of Apple, APPLE (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple/ 
[https://perma.cc/3VGT-8P8A]; Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 569. 
309. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(2018). 
310. See infra Section IV.A. 
311. See, e.g., In re: Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in The Execution of a 
Search Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
[hereinafter Brooklyn action]. At the time of the Brooklyn action, there were at least nine 
separate requests made under the AWA to order Apple to help the government with 
bypassing the encryption measures—Apple objected to each request. Id. at 349. 
312. See Grady Lowman, Apple vs. FBI: The Forgotten Fourth Amendment Argument, 
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (Mar. 21, 2016), https://rutgerspolicyjournal.org/apple-vs-
fbi-forgotten-fourth-amendment-argument [https://perma.cc/RM6Q-4UUN]; Maxel 
Moreland, Apple Inc. and the FBI: Balancing Fourth Amendment Privacy Concerns against 
Societal Safety Concerns in the Digital Age, U. CIN. L. REV. (June 17, 2016), 
https://uclawreview.org/2016/06/17/apple-inc-and-the-fbi-balancing-4th-amendment-
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Court has discussed, as recently as 2018, the Fourth Amendment’s 
relationship with data from smartphones.313 Regarding the 
second issue, whether lawful hacking violates reasonable 
expectations of privacy, recent Fourth Amendment decisions 
about cell phones suggest that cell phone data must be given 
heightened protection.314 This Part will proceed by first, offering 
a discussion on the AWA by analyzing the first issue, and then 
second, by discussing the Fourth Amendment and analyzing the 
second issue. 
A. Using the All Writs Act to Compel Apple to Create a Backdoor for the 
US Government 
The All Writs Act states that “[t]he Supreme Court and all 
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”315 The act serves as 
a gap-filler for a federal court to use when no other law might 
provide it authority to make a judgment or an order.316 As a 
threshold matter, federal courts are only given discretionary 
authority to issue orders when three elements are met: 
(1) issuance of the writ must be ‘in aid of’ the issuing court’s 
jurisdiction; 
(2) the type of writ requested must be necessary or 
appropriate to provide such aid to the issuing court’s 
jurisdiction; and 
(3) the issuance of the writ must be agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law.317 
However, the All Writs Act is infrequently used, and there is 
little judicial guidance on whether it could be used to compel 
Apple to modify its code to provide a backdoor into its devices.318 
 
privacy-concerns-against-societal-safety-concerns-in-the-digital-age/ 
[https://perma.cc/CE96-SDFM]. But see Kerr, Preliminary thoughts, supra note 68; 
Traylor, supra note 27, at 510. 
313. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
314. See id. at 2218. 
315. All Writs Act, 28 USC § 1651 (2018). 
316. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 353. 
317. Id. at 350. 
318. See id. at 349. 
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The most recent Supreme Court decision involving AWA, 
United States v. New York Telephone Co.,319 offers some guidance for 
how to interpret the act. It was a different time with different 
technologies, yet the Supreme Court dealt with the same tension 
of whether the AWA could be used to compel a company to 
provide technical assistance to the FBI in the pursuit of shutting 
down criminal activities.320 In New York Telephone, the FBI sought 
the company’s help with installing pen registers321 on phone lines 
belonging to individuals suspected of running a gambling ring.322 
The company, pursuant to a judicial order, had already provided 
some help, including identifying the telephone lines associated 
with the suspected phone numbers, but declined when asked to 
lease to the FBI unused telephone lines that ran near the 
suspected telephone line.323 In finding for the FBI, the Supreme 
Court identified three additional factors to consider when 
interpreting the AWA: 
(1) the closeness of the relationship between the person or 
entity to whom the proposed writ is directed and the matter 
over which the court has jurisdiction; 
(2) the reasonableness of the burden to be imposed on the 
writ’s subject; and 
(3) the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court’s 
jurisdiction.324 
So here, it was New York Telephone’s facilities that were 
being used, the burden to lease the lines to install pen registers 
was very low (especially because the company itself used them for 
its own purposes), and it was only the company that impeded the 
FBI from identifying those involved in the gambling enterprise. 
This decision guides current understanding on the proper 
application of the AWA. 
 
319. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
320. See id. at 161. 
321. Pen registers are devices that record the numbers dialed from a wired 
telephone. See Pen Register, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
322. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162. 
323. See id. Installing a pen register on the nearby lines allowed for the FBI to 
monitor the incoming and outgoing calls of the suspect phone lines. 
324. See id. at 174-78; Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d. at 351. 
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1. Current Jurisprudence on Applying the AWA to iPhones 
There is no existing explicit law that the US government can 
use to require a technology company to build a backdoor into its 
encrypted devices. When the issue was brought to court, the 
government depended on the AWA as its primary argument. Two 
different federal courts issued contemporaneous orders on 
whether the federal government can compel Apple to modify its 
encryption code to allow for extraordinary access to iPhones.325 
In both cases, the US government argued that the AWA must be 
interpreted to permit the government to compel Apple to assist 
its efforts in gathering the data from the phone.326 In both cases, 
Apple argued that the AWA must be read to leave the decision to 
compel to the legislature.327 Ultimately, the US government 
withdrew both suits, rendering the debate in the courts moot. 
Despite the pause in the courts, it is worth exploring these 
opinions to understand how the Encryption Debate could be 
resolved in the US given that the tension between the two entities 
remains.328 
After Apple denied additional help for unlocking the iPhone 
recovered from the San Bernardino shooting,329 the US 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) then sought the assistance of a 
federal court to compel the company to provide the technical 
assistance required.330 Using the AWA as authority, the 
government argued that 1) Apple was not far removed from the 
underlying controversy and the related investigation because it 
designed the phone and coded the software at issue;331 2) the 
specific technical assistance sought would not present an 
unreasonable burden on Apple because a software company is 
 
325. See In re: An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant 
on a Black Lexus IS300, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) 
[hereinafter California action]; Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d. at 344. 
326. See Govt’s Ex Parte Appl. for Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search; Mem. of Points and Authorities; Decl. of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibit (ED No. 
15-0415M) [hereinafter DOJ Motion]. 
327. See Apple Inc.’s Mot. to Vacate Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents 
in Search, and Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. to Compel Assistance (ED No. CM 16-10 (SP)) 
[hereinafter Apple Motion]. 
328. See supra Section II.B. 
329. See supra Section II.B.i. 
330. See DOJ Motion supra note 326, at 1. 
331. See id. at 13. 
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capable of modifying its own code for a specific device;332 and 3) 
Apple’s technical assistance is necessary in furtherance of the 
lawful warrant to search the phone.333 Shortly after filing in 
federal court, the judge issued a three-page order requiring 
Apple to provide the technical assistance in the manner 
requested to achieve the objectives listed.334  
Apple, in response, filed a motion to vacate the DOJ’s 
motion, framing the DOJ’s request to “create a back door” as one 
that would “undermine the basic security and privacy interests of 
hundreds of millions of individuals around the globe.”335 Apple 
first argues that both Congress and the Obama Administration 
considered the tension, and ultimately decided to not update 
existing relevant laws to include Apple and like technology 
companies within the statutory purview.336 Next, in applying the 
New York Telephone discretionary factors, Apple argued 1) its 
connection to the underlying controversy and the related 
investigation is too attenuated because it does not own the phone 
nor have access to the data;337 2) the government’s request would 
impose a substantial undue burden on both Apple and the 
customers who depend on their device;338 and 3) the government 
did not establish that Apple’s assistance was necessary in 
furtherance of the warrant.339 A hearing was scheduled for March 
22, 2016 but was later cancelled when the FBI revealed it was able 
to access the phone through the assistance of a third party.340 
 
332. See id. at 14. 
333. See id. at 16. The motion does not state why Apple’s assistance is necessary 
other than citing an analogous case involving an encrypted laptop. 
334. See California action, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543. Given that it was an order, 
there is no analysis of the AWA. 
335. See Apple Motion, supra note 327, at 1. 
336. See id. at 8. 
337. See id. at 20. 
338. See id. at 23. 
339. Id. at 29. Apple also put forth arguments that the order violates its First 
Amendment right from writing code and its Fifth Amendment right of due process. See 
generally id. While both these arguments are important, they will not be discussed in this 
analysis given that this Section focuses on the use of the AWA. 
340. See Kim Zetter & Brian Barrett, Apple to FBI: You Can’t Force Us to Hack the San 
Bernardino iPhone, WIRED MAG. (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-brief-fbi-response-iphone/ 
[https://perma.cc/SPM8-V2HB]; Collier & Favirar, supra note 92 (reporting that the US 
government enlisted third-party company, Cellebrite, to hack into the phone). 
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In a different case, a federal judge in the Eastern District of 
New York entertained the same arguments as above and instead 
found Apple’s argument to be more compelling. In In re: Order 
Requiring Apple, Inc. To Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant 
Issued by this Court, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) 
seized, pursuant to a warrant, an iPhone 5s running iOS7 that 
belonged to an individual suspected of drug trafficking.341 As with 
the iPhone in California, government investigative efforts were 
impeded by the iPhone’s passcode security.342 The government 
then turned to the court to compel Apple to provide technical 
assistance in unlocking the phone, relying on the AWA and the 
cases interpreting it.343 Finding for Apple, Judge Orenstein 
opined that the government failed to establish the threshold 
requirement that its request was agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law because the legislative scheme regarding the 
relationship between government surveillance and third-party 
technology and communications suggested otherwise.344 First, the 
limitation provisions in the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (“CALEA”)345 apply to Apple because it 
qualifies under the “information services” exemption.346 Second, 
issuing in favor of the government would violate the separation of 
powers doctrine because Congress had considered this issue and 
chose not to enact a law addressing it.347 For Orenstein, the AWA 
analysis ends at the threshold level, but he opines on the New York 
Telephone discretionary factors to explain that the AWA analysis 
would still achieve the same result.348 In sum, Apple was not 
sufficiently close in relationship with either the criminal activity 
 
341. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Though not 
relevant for the purposes of the analysis, this iPhone runs an older version of iOS that 
has markedly less encryption measures than the iPhone from San Bernardino. 
342. See id. at 346. 
343. See id. 
344. See id. at 354. 
345. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 
(2018). 
346. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 355. Interestingly, Judge Orenstein 
accepted the distinction between data-in-motion and data-at-rest. See supra Section II.A. 
But he did not think this distinction changed his opinion that CALEA, which uses 
language referring to data-in-motion, applies to data-at-rest. Id. 
347. See id. at 363. For a brief discussion on pending legislative actions, see Section 
V.A. 
348. See id. at 364. 
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or the investigation,349 compelling Apple to provide technical 
assistance that would erode the iPhone’s encryption measures 
would be unduly burdensome,350 and the availability of third 
parties who can provide assistance into accessing the iPhone 
weakens the government’s argument that Apple must be the one 
to provide technical assistance.351 The opinion ends by reiterating 
that the debate is a decision best left to be resolved by Congress.352 
2. The All Writs Act Cannot be Interpreted to Compel Apple to 
Write Code that Creates a Backdoor for the Government. 
Setting aside the threshold issue of whether CALEA applies 
and precludes this inquiry, Apple presents the stronger argument 
against the adoption of backdoors. The first factor, looking at the 
closeness of the relationship between the directed entity and the 
underlying controversy, favors Apple. Arguably, since it originally 
made the argument in 2015, Apple has provided more complex 
encryption measures that are less susceptible to hacking.353 These 
increased measures suggest that although before Apple may not 
have had as close a relationship with any of the underlying crimes 
(indeed it did not with either the shooting or the drug 
trafficking), its actions have since reluctantly provided protection 
to those perpetrators who rely on the encryption to continue their 
crimes. Encrypted iPhones can now safely serve as the phone of 
choice for those who need that privacy measure in evading lawful 
governmental action. Terrorist cells can exploit the availability of 
encryption measures as ISIS did when it instructed its followers to 
use encryption measures to dodge law enforcement officials.354 
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance testified to Congress 
about a sex-trafficking investigation impeded by encryption, 
where the incarcerated suspect in a recorded phone call said, 
“Apple and Google came out with these softwares that can no 
longer be [un]encrypted by the police . . . [i]f our phone[s are] 
 
349. See id. 
350. See id. at 368. 
351. See id. at 373. 
352. See id. at 376. 
353. The latest version of the software, iOS 14, now requires applications 
downloaded from the App Store to abide by Apple’s privacy and security standards. See 
User Privacy and Data Use, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-
and-data-use/ [https://perma.cc/CZ5V-W8EQ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
354. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 571. 
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running on iOS8 software, they can’t open my phone. That may 
be [a] gift from God.”355 Last, as articulated earlier in this Note, 
there is an increasing concern that encryption creates a safe 
haven for pedophiles and others who seek to sexually exploit 
minors.356 Still, these examples only serve to illustrate that while 
encryption may be another tool for individuals to exploit, it is 
simply that—a tool. The use of an iPhone in a criminal 
undertaking does not automatically implicate Apple, especially 
because there exist legitimate uses for the device and the 
encryption measures ensure the security of the information on 
the phone for the average user, not just criminal users. For 
comparison, if the iPhone were a gun, the blame for a shooting 
shifts to the person who pulled the trigger, not the gun 
manufacturer.357 
The second factor, regarding the reasonableness of the 
burden on Apple, also is in its favor. In the California case, Apple 
explained the time and costs it would take to build the type of 
software the government seeks.358 Critics are justifiably skeptical 
of this reasoning, given that Apple’s market value was well over 
US$2 trillion in August 2020, and its products continue to see 
incredible success globally as society increasingly relies on 
technology for everyday life.359 Apple also posited that given its 
role in consumer data protection, creating a system that could be 
 
355. See Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of Cyrus Vance, Jr., NY Cnty. Dist. Att’y), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Vance%20Testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CNB-GH5Q]. 
356. See supra Section II.B.iii. 
357. Recognizing the harm that could be imposed on firearms manufacturers, 
Congress effectively immunized them with the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
Act (“PLCAA”). See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903; 
see also Melissa Chan, Just About Everyone but the Gun Maker Gets Sued After a Mass Shooting, 
TIME (Aug. 20, 2019), https://time.com/5653066/mass-shooting-lawsuits/ 
[https://perma.cc/LK7B-WJBU]. 
358. See Apple motion, supra note 335, at 23. 
359. See Amrith Ramkumar, Apple Hits $2 Trillion Market Value as App Store Battles 
Continue, WALL ST. J. (Aug, 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-surges-to-2-
trillion-market-value-11597848808 [https://perma.cc/9RJG-PXQV]; Jack Nicas, Apple 
Reaches $2 Trillion, Punctuating Big Tech’s Grip, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/technology/apple-2-trillion.html 
[https://perma.cc/XBL3-PZPD]. Almost certainly the COVID-19 pandemic benefited 
Apple as the shift to working from home may have led to an increased demand for the 
requisite technology. 
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vulnerable to outside attacks would “substantially tarnish the 
Apple brand,”360 and would hurt the US economy overall as the 
subset of consumers who desire encryption shift to foreign 
manufacturers who sell encrypted devices.361 Again, it is dubious 
whether that reasoning is valid because of the question of whether 
consumers actually care about data protection measures on their 
phone.362 More, it is unlikely that Apple’s market power would 
suffer at all if the US government were to institute an 
extraordinary access requirement.363 Even so, the factor is likely 
to be in Apple’s favor considering that the scale of the burden is 
substantially more than what the Supreme Court considered in 
New York Telephone. There, the Supreme Court found the order 
appropriate given that the company’s own use of pen registers for 
business reasons demonstrated the minimal burden the FBI’s 
request imposed upon them.364 Unlike that of the telephone 
company, Apple’s response would certainly cost significantly 
more in both time, expense, and reputation even if it is a 
technology giant more equipped to handle such costs. 
The last factor, whether Apple’s assistance is necessary to 
accomplish the goal of the writ, is decidedly in its favor. As Judge 
Orenstein astutely pointed out, the government ultimately 
engaging with third party companies demonstrates that Apple’s 
technical assistance is not necessary.365 It is true that Apple is the 
only actor that can modify the encryption code on its future 
phones, especially considering that its software is proprietary 
code that is installed on patented devices. Only in that sense can 
their assistance be necessary. But that is not the case here, because 
the underlying goal of a warrant issued in a criminal investigation 
is the resolution of a past crime or the prevention of a likely future 
crime, and the warrant is tied to the specific circumstances of 
each case.366 Speculating on future misuse of an encrypted 
 
360. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
361. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 169-70. 
362. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 172. 
363. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 227. 
364. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (“The Company 
concedes that it regularly employs such devices without court order for the purposes of 
checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law.”). 
365. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 at 373. 
366. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that 
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under 
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smartphone is not a sufficient reason to characterize Apple’s 
technical assistance as necessary. Evidently, the US federal 
government is equipped to either hack into the phone on its own 
or contract with a third party.367 
B. The Fourth Amendment Privacy Implications of Lawful Hacking 
Privacy concerns, especially privacy from government 
surveillance, became relevant in the Encryption Debate when 
Apple framed itself as a protector of its consumers’ privacy.368 To 
reiterate, privacy concerns are very different from the 
cybersecurity concerns that Apple emphasized in its motions.369 
Whereas cybersecurity touches more on the security of the 
infrastructure protecting the information, privacy refers more to 
the conception that a person has a right to be free from outside 
intrusion into the most intimate or confidential part of their 
lives.370 Apple, in its public role as a protector of consumer data, 
makes good on its promise of privacy through the encryption 
measures on its devices.371 The United States does not have an 
overall privacy law, and instead takes a sectoral approach to the 
right of privacy.372 In the United States, concerns regarding 
privacy from government action implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, and this next Section will delve into whether any 
concerns are raised when the US government lawfully hacks into 
an iPhone. 
1. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
 
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing 
another. As to what is to be taken nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing 
the warrant.”). 
367. See discussion supra Section II.B.i (explaining how the FBI hired a third party 
for the San Bernardino iPhone and internal methods for the Pensacola iPhones). 
368. See Cook letter, supra note 71. 
369. See supra Section II.A.i (distinguishing between privacy and cybersecurity 
concerns). 
370. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that the US 
Constitution creates zones, or penumbras, of privacy). 
371. See supra Section II.A.iii.  
372. Ari E. Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 129, 144 
(2018). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures.”373 For a search or seizure to 
be reasonable, a neutral judge must first issue a warrant justified 
by probable cause.374 The Fourth Amendment was the Founding 
Fathers’ response to Great Britain’s arbitrary use of writs of 
assistance in colonial America, and imposed a limit on the federal 
government’s ability to intrude into an individual’s private 
physical space.375 Though the case law has considerably changed 
since its adoption, the heart of the Fourth Amendment is its 
fundamental protection against overly pervasive government 
intrusion and surveillance.376 In Katz v. United States,377 the 
Supreme Court reframed the scope of the Fourth Amendment as 
a protection that is based on a person’s notion of privacy, and 
rejected earlier interpretations that focused only on tangible, 
material interests.378 The Katz Court found the government’s use 
of wiretapping technology to record an otherwise private phone 
conversation problematic because “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”379 Moving forward, the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment analysis hinged on two-prongs: “first, that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”380 
Since Katz, the Supreme Court (and the judiciary, in 
general) has struggled with drawing bright-lines for which 
circumstances generate an objectively reasonable expectation of 
 
373. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
374. Id. 
375. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014). 
376. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214. 
377. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
378. The majority opinion departs from the narrow view articulated in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which uses the trespass doctrine to define the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. The Katz Court found significant the 
difference between the petitioner’s physical presence in a public phone booth and his 
phone call within that space. Id. at 511. 
379. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
380. Id. at 361. Even though this test is from the concurrence, it is the one that’s 
used most often. The Court reiterated the “reasonable expectation of society” test in 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding a party must exhibit a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the place searched to have standing challenging a government 
search). The test was, shortly thereafter, formally adopted in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979). 
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privacy,381 especially in light of rapidly evolving technology that 
can undermine such expectations.382 Yet, though the Court has 
identified specific circumstances that “render a warrantless 
search or seizure reasonable,” no government action is “beyond 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, for it must be reasonable in its 
scope and manner of execution.”383 In applying Fourth 
Amendment principles to its treatment of phones, two recent 
Supreme Court decisions are informative and touch on the 
heightened protections given to smartphones because, like many 
technologies, they have become an essential part of an 
individual’s life. These two cases, amongst others, offers some 
guidance on how the Supreme Court might decide if the question 
of lawful hacking comes before them. 
In Riley v. California,384 the Court held that a warrantless 
search and seizure of the digital contents of a cell phone is 
unconstitutional, even when the phone is seized incident to an 
arrest. During the arrest for an earlier unlawful activity, a police 
officer searched David Riley and seized a smart phone from his 
body.385 At that time and later again at the police station, a police 
officer had gone through the phone and uncovered evidence of 
Riley’s involvement with a shooting a few weeks earlier—the 
investigating officers did not have a separate warrant to go 
through Riley’s phone.386 Chief Justice Roberts posited two 
observations that persuaded him and the rest of the Court that 
smartphones must be given special treatment. First, cell phones 
are ubiquitous such that an alien species may perceive it “an 
important feature of human anatomy.”387 Second, there is an 
understanding that “modern cell phones, as a category, implicate 
privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by a cigarette pack, 
 
381. It is relevant to note that courts do not dwell on whether the first prong is ever 
met, and that the Fourth Amendment test focuses on the second prong. See Kerr, supra 
note 68; Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 372 
(2019) [hereinafter Ohm II]. 
382. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
383. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 444, 447-48 (2013). 
384. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
385. Id. at 379. David Riley was arrested after an earlier lawful search of his car 
revealed his unlawful possession of concealed and loaded firearms. Id. at 378. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. at 385. 
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a wallet, or a purse.”388 Even a brief search through an iPhone can 
reveal a host of confidential information to which a person is 
otherwise not privy. Thus, any search for digital information on a 
smartphone must be done pursuant to a warrant.389 
Carpenter v. United States390 likewise dealt with the amount of 
data that can be garnered from a cell phone, more specifically, 
holding that law enforcement would need warrants to gather 
cellular service location information (“CSLI”).391 In addition to 
reformulating the third-party doctrine,392 Chief Justice Roberts 
stressed the role of the court to rebalance privacy interests when 
faced against law enforcement equipped with powerful 
surveillance tools.393 This decision, along with Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones394 and the 
majority opinion in Riley,395 emphasizes the unique role that 
mobile phones play in individuals’ lives and the way that 
technological advances give the government more tools to 
intrude into a person’s private area.396 Thus, investigations into 
smartphone data must have heightened protections. 
 
388. Id. at 393. 
389. Id. at 401. 
390. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 
391. Id. at 2223. 
392. Unlike Riley’s inquiry into data gathered from within the device, Carpenter 
dealt with information collected from cell site towers and its implications for the third-
party doctrine. The third-party doctrine is premised on the theory that the disclosing 
party adopts an assumption of risk of the further dissemination of that information by 
the third-party. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (finding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in pen records because the information was being conveyed to a 
telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records because this was information disclosed 
to banks and their employees in the ordinary course of business). Third-party doctrine 
is not at issue in any encryption cases because encryption ensures that the information is 
never disclosed to a third party. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 26. 
393. The opinion states, in relevant part, “[f]irst, that the Amendment seeks to 
secure the privacies of life against arbitrary power, and Second, and relatedly, that a 
central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police 
surveillance.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (citations omitted). 
394. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012). 
395. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
396. This is not a new view in the court. In an earlier case, Justice Kennedy opined, 
“[c]ell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may 
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even 
self-identification.” See City of Ontario, Cal., v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010). 
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2. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy after Carpenter 
At present, there is no legal authority that explicitly permits 
lawfully hacking into encrypted devices, nor has there been any 
cases challenging its constitutionality.397 Still, it stands to reason 
that after Riley and Carpenter, law enforcement may lawfully hack 
into an encrypted smartphone provided they have a warrant in 
hand, which is often the case. Though smartphones and 
smartphone data receive heightened protection, law 
enforcement could still access the data after securing a legitimate 
warrant based on probable cause. While these phones relied on 
encryption, a phone holder’s expectation of privacy, premised on 
that reliance, is diminished once that device is lawfully seized and 
a warrant to search the contents of the phone is issued. The 
Fourth Amendment does not protect cell phone data per se, but it 
does protect individuals against oppressive methods in acquiring 
that information. The Amendment is a promise against the 
arbitrary use of state power. Lawfully hacking into a phone after 
securing a legitimate warrant does not implicate the privacy 
concerns raised by the Fourth Amendment. 
Professor Orin Kerr has consistently argued that encryption 
does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.398 Encryption 
makes accessing the data on the phone difficult, but that difficulty 
itself does not provide a phone holder with additional Fourth 
Amendment rights. Once the government has a warrant to search 
the digital information in a smartphone, as required by Riley, it 
may do so without running afoul of any constitutional violations 
because the Fourth Amendment “does not protect the individual 
if the government decides to devote its resources to [successfully] 
decrypting” the device.399 Even so, the Court’s concerns in 
Carpenter suggest its willingness to revisit the issue in the future if 
it becomes apparent that the balance between privacy and police 
power becomes unsettled.  
Professor Paul Ohm notes that the Court is dealing with tech 
exceptionalism, an idea that the exceptionalism of modern 
 
397. Candace Gliksberg, Note, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
765, 790 (2017); Manpearl, supra note 20, at 191. 
398. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 504 
(2001) [hereinafter Kerr II]; Kerr, supra note 68. 
399. Kerr II, supra note 398, at 517. 
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technology does not sit squarely with previous judicial opinions 
and conceptions of law.400 Rather than stick with traditional 
analogies, the Court in both Riley and Carpenter looked at the 
reality of what cell phones produce and, in each opinion, Chief 
Justice Roberts advised taking into account the sophisticated 
technologies present today or potentially available in the 
future,401 and echoed Justice Brandeis’s concern from a case fifty 
years prior.402 The modern smartphone is the “perfect 
surveillance device.”403 
For now, a defendant contesting lawful hacking could argue 
that the hacking was unreasonable in its scope and manner of 
execution. To be reasonable in scope and manner of execution, 
a judge must abide by the particularity requirement for issuing a 
warrant,404 and should only permit the collection of information 
if the collection achieves the stated objectives and is completed in 
the least intrusive manner possible. A higher standard must apply 
whenever a judge considers an application for a warrant to access 
information in a smartphone, and any affidavit supplied in 
support of an application for a warrant must provide a substantial 
basis for probable cause.405 This could mean that those going 
through the phone must take care to not complete a full scan of 
the phone and instead only look through the relevant 
applications in the phone, or that the warrant only permits some 
types of evidence for collection. For example, those going 
through a phone to find evidence of child pornography need only 
to go through the photos and videos to see whether the individual 
violates any child pornography laws. In United States v. Zappe,406 a 
magistrate judge issued a warrant to search the defendant’s 
 
400. Ohm II, supra note 381, at 399. 
401. Id. at 409. 
402. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) 
(“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of 
what is whispered in the closet.”).  
403. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“perfect surveillance 
device” language). 
404. See generally Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
405. See, e.g., United States v. Calk, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116013 (finding that the 
thirty-seven-page affidavit sufficiently alleged probable cause in a warrant application). 
406. United States v. Zappe, No. 5-20-CR-00284-OLG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191122 
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2020). 
2021] APPLE, THE GOVERNMENT, AND YOU 835 
iPhone for child pornography. The defendant contested the 
warrant, claiming that it was overbroad in scope. The court 
rejected the defendant’s contentions and explained in detail that 
the warrant was valid and not overbroad given that “there was 
ample probable cause to suspect Zappe possessed child 
pornography” and that iPhones are capable of storing sexually 
explicit images of young children.407 
Technology has advanced such that it collects every shard 
and piece of an individual’s life, and when put together, paints a 
mosaic of users that is more probative than any actual 
utterance.408 The latest iPhones do not just store information, like 
photos and communications. They also track movements and 
collect other data in service of each user. The Health App, for 
example, automatically counts each person’s steps. Smartphones 
reveal more information than the search of a house ever could, 
and even non-content information, or metadata, can be 
significant in finding someone guilty of a crime. Until digital 
search technology is developed so that it performs targeted 
searches on phones, law enforcement agencies must be careful in 
the data they recover. A judge, when assessing a warrant 
application, should be aware of these considerations and assess 
on a case-by-case basis whether the sought-after information 
would justify the pervasive violation of privacy incurred by the 
device holder. 
V. LAWFUL HACKING AS THE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO 
THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE 
To law enforcement, encryption is an impediment to its 
ability to investigate crimes and hold perpetrators responsible. To 
users of devices, encryption is a promise of privacy and security. 
To Apple, encryption is not only a business strategy but an almost 
guaranteed way to avoid future litigation for failing to guard 
customer data. In resolving the Encryption Debate, the United 
States must carefully balance the legitimate interests of law 
enforcement against the serious security and privacy implications 
 
407. Id. at 16. 
408. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (explaining the extent of the government’s ability to aggregate data via 
monitoring). 
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posed by accessing smartphone data. The central argument for 
imposing backdoor requirements is efficiency and expediency. 
Law enforcement agencies want extraordinary access because it 
allows for quicker results with minimal costs. But until there is a 
feasible technological solution, lawful hacking is the only viable 
choice in moving forward in the Encryption Debate. Given the 
ever-present tension between government surveillance and 
individual security and privacy, lawful hacking forces each side to 
compromise while still maintaining its overall goals. Of the two 
options discussed in this Note, lawful hacking presents itself as the 
more desirable solution. This Part will proceed by first discussing 
current legislation proposed in the United States, and then 
offering normative arguments against the adoption of backdoors, 
and normative arguments for continued use of lawful hacking. 
A. Current US Legislation 
In the United States, as concluded by Judge Orenstein,409 it 
is up to the legislature whether it wants to provide the 
government with additional powers, not the judiciary. The 
Supreme Court has likewise echoed this sentiment in the context 
of evolving technologies. Justice Samuel Alito opined, “In 
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best 
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body 
is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”410 The existence of CALEA and the overall 
legislative scheme suggests that Congress has considered this 
tension before and that a law requiring a backdoor into an 
encrypted device is not outside the realm of possibility.411 
The US Congress is currently grappling with both issues 
posed by this conundrum and is considering drafted legislation 
on exactly these issues. On March 5, 2020, US Senator Lindsey 
Graham introduced in the Senate the Eliminating Abusive and 
Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2020 
 
409. See Brooklyn Action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
410. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
411. If this were the case, Apple and other technology companies might then file a 
case arguing a violation of their First Amendment rights. This discussion, though 
relevant, is outside the scope of this Note. 
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(“EARN IT Act”).412 The bill responds to the problem of 
encrypted technologies perpetuating the sexual exploitation of 
children413 by proposing that Section 230 of the Communications 
Act (“Section 230”) be amended to impose liability on internet 
service providers that provide end-to-end encryption but do not 
provide law enforcement officials the means to decrypt the 
material.414 Section 230 immunizes online platforms from liability 
for the actions of its users, but the EARN IT Act would remove 
those protections if those platforms host sexually explicit material 
depicting children.415 The EARN IT Act has undergone several 
revisions in the Senate and is currently accompanied by a House 
of Representatives version of the bill with similar language.416 
More directly on point is a subsequent bill introduced by 
Senator Graham. On June 23, 2020, Senator Graham with 
Senators Tom Cotton and Marsha Blackburn introduced the 
Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act (“LAED”).417 LAED 
addresses the frustrations expressed by law enforcement agencies 
tasked with the prevention and detection of matters of national 
security by effectively requiring technology companies to build in 
backdoors to their devices.418 The bill proposes several 
 
412. Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 
2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020). 
413. Keller & Dance, supra note 111. See also Susan Landau, A Thoughtful Response 
to Going Dark and the Child Pornography Issue, LAWFARE (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtful-response-going-dark-and-child-pornography-
issue [https://perma.cc/RZZ6-27ML]. 
414. The bill has gone through several revisions in the Senate, and is accompanied 
by H.R. 8454. See Riana Pfefferkorn, House Introduces EARN IT Act Companion Bill, Somehow 
Manages To Make It Even Worse, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y. (Oct. 5, 2020), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/10/house-introduces-earn-it-act-companion-
bill-somehow-manages-make-it-even-worse [https://perma.cc/W98R-FUEA]. 
415. Riana Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s twin threats to online speech and security, 
BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-senates-twin-
threats-to-online-speech-and-security/ [https://perma.cc/D8WF-XNUG]. 
416. Id. See also Pfefferkorn, House Introduces EARN IT, supra note 414. 
417. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act, S. 4051, 116th Cong. (2020). 
418. Press Release, Senate Judiciary Comm., Graham, Cotton, Blackburn Introduce 
Balanced Solution to Bolster National Security, End Use of Warrant-Proof Encryption 
that Shields Criminal Activity (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/graham-cotton-blackburn-
introduce-balanced-solution-to-bolster-national-security-end-use-of-warrant-proof-
encryption-that-shields-criminal-activity [https://perma.cc/82ED-KZD4]; Riana 
Pfefferkorn, There’s now an even worse Anti-Encryption Bill than Earn It. That Doesn’t Make 
the Earn It Bill OK, CTR. INTERNET SOC’Y (June 24, 2020), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/06/there%E2%80%99s-now-even-worse-anti-
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amendments to a variety of current laws, and essentially is an 
overhaul of the current scheme such that it imposes obligations 
on almost any provider of encryption services or products.419 One 
of the provisions, the “assistance capability directive,” even 
mirrors the TCN language present in both the UK’s Investigatory 
Powers Act and Australia’s Assistance and Access Act.420 The bill 
has not yet progressed beyond its introduction in the Senate.421 
The jurisdictions discussed in Part III employ a wide variety 
of approaches in their own struggles with how to resolve the 
Encryption Debate. The United Kingdom’s IPA,422 for example, 
can be read to allow for compulsion of a backdoor. On the other 
hand, Australia’s AAB423 and Germany’s legal scheme424 articulate 
a legislative choice not to permit backdoors considering the 
cybersecurity and privacy concerns. If the United States does 
choose to pass a bill, the fact that Apple already complies with 
Chinese localization laws425 demonstrates that Apple will likely 
comply with similar laws in each country in which it operates. Still, 
there are several compelling reasons why the US government 
should act with caution in passing a law requiring technology 
companies to modify code permitting extraordinary access. 
B. The Normative Argument Against Backdoors 
One of the main arguments against backdoors is that they 
undermine data protection measures.426 In the last couple of 
years, several companies have been scrutinized by both the public 
and by the government for failing to protect customer data. In 




419. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act § 3119(a)(1) defines “consumer 
electronic device” as a device that may be purchased by a member of the general public 
and one that contains more than 1 gigabyte of storage. That is effectively most electronic 
devices out there. See also Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s twin threats, supra note 415. 
420. See Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s Twin Threats, supra note 415. 
421. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act, S. 4051, 116th Cong. (2020). 
422. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25 (UK). 
423. The Assistance and Access Act 2018 (Austl.). 
424. See discussion supra Section III.c. 
425. See discussion supra Section III.d. 
426. See Manpearl II, supra note 75, at 80. 
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accounts were hacked.427 Though the investigation determined 
Apple’s software was not to blame, the fallout from the incident 
highlighted first, Apple’s role as the entity purportedly 
safeguarding personal information, and second, the 
vulnerabilities of an insecure system.428 By compelling Apple to 
create a backdoor, governments risk exacerbating an already 
delicate problem. Smartphones have become a critical part of 
most peoples’ lives. Not only do iPhones provide a way for people 
to communicate, they also serve as storage devices for photos, 
notes, mementos, and thoughts.429 iPhones are capable of 
retaining sensitive information such as passwords to banking 
applications and other services.430 US companies lose over 
US$360 billion per year to intellectual property theft, cybercrime, 
and costs of downtime.431 An extensive amount of information 
would be at risk of being publicly disclosed by malicious third 
parties who could manipulate the backdoor access code.432 
Additionally, cybersecurity threats from foreign nations alone 
provides a compelling argument to not adopt measures that 
weaken any available information security systems. The US 
government recognized that foreign countries can manipulate 
existing technologies when Russian forces influenced voters in 
the 2016 election, when a North Korean group hacked into Sony, 
and when the popular Chinese app TikTok collected data of US 
citizens.433 Government proponents argue that this is simply an 
easily resolved engineering problem.434 Mandating a backdoor 
requirement would exacerbate existing cybersecurity issues. 
Setting aside the cybersecurity issues, several other issues persist. 
Second, in a related fashion, mandating backdoors harms all 
users of iPhones, not just persons who are individually targeted, 
 
427. Erin Durkin, Hacker sentenced to prison for role in Jennifer Lawrence nude photo 




429. See Traylor, supra note 27, at 490. 
430. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 169. 
431. See id. 
432. Morrison, supra note 72, at 425 (discussing the keys under doormats problem). 
433. Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-
incidents [https://perma.cc/GL6U-ZX8J] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
434. See Barr, supra note 115. 
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and poses a serious risk to minority defendants.435 If a government 
compels Apple to modify its code to provide a backdoor into a 
phone, Apple would have to implement this change on every 
iPhone for the backdoor requirement to be effective. In its letter 
to consumers in the California action, Apple noted: 
The government suggests this tool could only be used once, 
on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the 
technique could be used over and over again, on any number 
of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent 
of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of 
locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No 
reasonable person would find that acceptable.436 
There is no way to guarantee that code will not then be used 
on other phones or not be used in an arbitrary manner. 
Governments desire the backdoor requirement so it can gain 
access to phones of suspects, but backdoors affect every phone 
user. A smartphone is the “perfect surveillance device”437 and a 
repository of evidence of potentially guilty actions.438 Even if the 
code was written such that third parties cannot manipulate and 
access the data, there is no guarantee the government itself will 
not abuse that privilege. The Snowden disclosures demonstrated 
that the US government used iPhones and other smartphones to 
spy on both citizens of foreign nations and its own citizens alike.439 
At a local level, if given the tool, police forces may use it in an 
uneven manner. Disguised racism and unconscious bias may lead 
to law enforcement using backdoors to investigate persons of 
specific races and from low-income communities. New York City’s 
Police Department, for example, was found liable for its stop-and-
frisk policy, which drew criticism for the disproportionate 
number of members from the Black and Latinx communities 
 
435. David Ruiz, There is No Middle Ground on Encryption, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(May 2, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/there-no-middle-ground-
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being stopped.440 A ProPublica exposé revealed that artificial 
intelligence programs used to predict the likelihood of recidivism 
in sentencing proceedings marked Black defendants as more 
likely to commit another crime as compared to their White 
counterparts.441 Backdoors risk increasing the disparity in the 
criminal justice system. Since the Snowden disclosures, Apple 
enhanced its software and increased its encryption measures to 
prevent this behavior in the future.442 By providing backdoor 
access, the potential for government abuse returns. 
Third, those committing wrongdoings are less likely to use 
devices if they know the government can easily gain access to the 
device.443 Encrypted phones have ex-post value: law enforcement 
seeks to unlock phones because of the probative evidence that is 
already on them, not what may be available in the future.444 
However, it is reasonable to assume that once criminals are aware 
of the vulnerabilities of their devices, they are less likely to use it 
to record their wrongdoing. As noted by the Electronic Fronter 
Foundation, an organization that defends civil liberties in the 
digital world, “it’s difficult to believe that many criminals” would 
not be smart enough to seek alternative methods for securing 
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their information and communications.445 A backdoor 
requirement would not prevent criminals from seeking devices 
that have encryption technologies or even developing their own, 
as Al-Qaeda purportedly did.446 
Last, the type of crimes that law enforcement generally seeks 
to stop are those which rely on communication between people, 
so perhaps the conversation should instead shift to end-to-end 
encryption instead of device encryption.447 When trying to access 
phones recovered from terrorists, law enforcement seeks 
information on other perpetrators and information about future 
attacks. British officials, for example, sought a terrorist’s 
WhatsApp communications after the terrorist drove a car into 
pedestrians in central London in an effort to identify others who 
may be planning more attacks.448 Local police forces may want 
evidence about past drug deals or information about future drug 
deals. The government could work with technology companies to 
confront end-to-end encryption instead of device encryption. 
This, however, would be an imperfect solution, but a solution 
nonetheless. Several types of crimes are not dependent on 
communications. Often, iPhones can hold probative evidence 
such as photo and video documentation of a crime. As Manhattan 
District Attorney Cyrus Vance noted, “That evidence can, among 
other things, implicate a particular person in a crime, exonerate 
a person of criminal responsibility, or identify additional victims 
of a criminal scheme.”449 The sexual exploitation of children 
serves as the prevalent example of when getting access to the 
content on an encrypted device is necessary. In the United States, 
possession of any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct 
involving a minor violates federal law.450 Suspected persons 
possessing the depictions on the device might never transmit the 
illicit materials, thus evading Apple’s software update that scans 
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for such images sent in transmission.451 Without some form of 
access to the suspected person’s iPhone, investigators are unable 
to gather the very evidence needed to charge him of a federal 
crime. 
C. The Normative Argument for Lawful Hacking 
Lawful hacking is an imperfect solution, but it works. Given 
the considerations articulated above, if law enforcement agencies 
seek data from an encrypted smartphone, they must be limited to 
accessing that data through lawful hacking only. The prevention, 
detection, and resolution of crimes is undoubtedly an important 
and compelling state interest. To that end, lawful hacking 
achieves the objective of gathering evidence from a perpetrator 
without compromising the security and privacy of every iPhone 
user. There are two main rationales for adopting a law that 
supports lawful hacking over one that requires backdoors. 
First, the very nature of lawful hacking means that law 
enforcement is more likely to concentrate its resources on the 
targeted phone.452 It forces law enforcement to pick and choose 
the phones they want to expend their resources on. This 
minimizes the risk of harm to all iPhone users, compared to 
backdoors where the harm is present for everyone. Arguably, 
given the concerns of bias in law enforcement, the possibility 
always remains that law enforcement will pick the phones 
belonging to minority populations, which can further exacerbate 
any race disparity issues. But this is less likely to be the case than 
with backdoors given that law enforcement may instead select 
phones that have the greatest potential to reveal significant 
information. 
Second, exploiting existing vulnerabilities motivates Apple 
and other technology companies to build more secure systems. 
Although this creates the technological arms race that law 
enforcement is loath to engage in, lawful hacking on its own 
serves as a check on technology companies’ promise of privacy 
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and security to its users. The fact that users pay for privacy is 
indicative of the need to maintain it.453 Even if Apple users do not 
take advantage of it, the protection is necessary for those who 
want it and use the phone in reliance on that promise. 
Critics speculate that the technological arms race will only 
create a new market for lawful hacking. Some fear that lawful 
hacking can be a bad thing because technology companies can 
bury trapdoors in their software and sell them later to the highest 
bidder, demonstrating an abuse of their power for capitalistic 
gains.454 Others are concerned that third party companies will 
exploit the fact their services are valuable to governments and will 
charge exorbitantly high price tags given that taxpayer money 
could be put to better use elsewhere.455 More, this creates a price 
point that smaller governments with less resources than federal 
level agencies like the FBI are unable to afford.456 Even so, to 
reiterate, by allowing for lawful hacking as the solution to the 
Encryption Debate, it forces governments to be selective in the 
phones they want to access without worsening a user’s state of 
security and privacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Governments seek a simple, efficient, and cost-effective 
solution, and those discussed have implemented a variety of 
approaches. The United Kingdom prioritized law enforcement 
needs and included provisions imposing strict requirements on 
technology companies in its approach, despite heavy public 
opinion against its adoption. China took this a step further by 
ensuring that its legal scheme consistently favors government 
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access to private data. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany 
strives to put individual privacy and security first, even while 
authorizing the use of lawful hacking. Australia, at present, offers 
the most balanced approach, though its law remains untested. 
The United States has yet to decide its stance on the Encryption 
Debate, and if it does, decisionmakers must balance pressing law 
enforcement needs with important concerns for privacy and 
security. 
Moving forward, how the United States approaches the 
Encryption Debate matters. The United States is a major player in 
the global community,457 and it is likely that its domestic policies 
will have an international impact. More, with US technology 
companies like Apple as some of the largest companies in the 
world,458 domestic legislation could alter the nature of the 
products on the international market.459 In theory, in response to 
divergent laws, technology companies can tailor their products to 
the different demands for each country. For example, Apple can 
continue to provide secure devices in the Australian market while 
selling devices with backdoor access in the Chinese market.460 
Whether this is feasible, or even desirable, is unknown. 
More, in the modern global state, countries look to each 
other to develop standards and evaluate options for troubling 
issues. Australia, for example, used language similar to the UK 
law, and in turn influenced US pending legislation. A more 
troubling problem, though, comes up when repressive regimes 
cite rhetoric from democratic nations to justify its perpetuation 
of human rights abuses.461 China, in particular, uses surveillance 
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technology to subject its minority Muslim Uyghur population to 
harsh conditions, and has placed over a million members of the 
group into concentration camps.462 It defended an early draft of 
one of its encryption bills by pointing to the debates in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, where it seemed evident that 
Western governments made it a practice to compel technology 
companies to assist with gathering information from encrypted 
phones.463 It was only after condemnation from the international 
community that China disposed of the problematic provision, but 
it can revisit that argument when democratic nations pass laws 
that have the effect of weakening civil liberties. Repressive 
regimes can justify their egregious actions by pointing to what is 
considered permissible elsewhere. 
Setting aside how individual countries use that information, 
countries share information gathered from different surveillance 
techniques with each other, as is evident with the FVEY network. 
This is even more apparent when the shared information is 
relevant to several countries, as can be the case with information 
regarding terrorist groups. More, instead of taking a state-by-state 
approach, countries could aspire to set international standards 
and adopt an international approach to the regulation of 
encryption technologies.464 These, of course, give rise to concerns 
of the global surveillance state and whether countries should do 
that because of what was learned from the Snowden disclosures. 
Given this context, this Note sought to provide a thorough 
explanation of the legal issues and normative concerns driving 
the global Encryption Debate. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the Encryption Debate is largely an engineering problem that 
requires cooperation between technology companies and 
governments. But, in identifying a path forward, relevant parties 
must not just consider the implications in one country, but the 
effect their choice could have globally. 
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